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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—CROSS-GENDER PAT SEARCHES:
THE BATTLE BETWEEN INMATES AND CORRECTIONS OFFICERS EN
TERS THE COURTROOM
INTRODUCTION
These pat-downs were delivered by both male and female
guards and ran the gamut from perfunctory to full-out inappro
priate.
Most of the male guards made a great show of performing the
absolute minimal frisk necessary, skimming their fingertips along
your arms, legs, and waist in such a way that said “Not touching!
Not touching! Not really touching!” They didn’t want any sug
gestion of impropriety raised against them. But a handful of the
male guards apparently felt no fear about grabbing whatever
they wanted. They were allowed to touch the lower edge of our
bras, to make sure we weren’t smuggling goodies in there—but
were they really allowed to squeeze our breasts? . . . Other male
COs were brazen, like the short, red-faced young bigmouth who
asked me loudly and repeatedly, “Where are the weapons of
mass destruction?” while he fondled my ass and I gritted my
teeth.1

Society is constantly evolving, adapting to the standards and
sensitivities of the current population. This evolution has been
marked with a number of great strides, many of which we take for
granted today. Women, for instance, assume they will not be dis
criminated against in employment decisions; not too long ago that
right would have appeared anything but certain.2 Prisoners’ rights
have also changed substantially since the days when the prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishment was understood solely as a prohi
bition on barbarous methods of punishment.3 Unfortunately, as so
cietal standards evolve, there are conflicts. This Note addresses one
such conflict: the use of cross-gender pat searches in United States
prisons pits prisoners’ rights—including constitutional rights such as
1. PIPER KERMAN, ORANGE IS THE NEW BLACK: MY YEAR IN A WOMEN’S
PRISON 236 (2010).
2. See infra notes 137-180 and accompanying text detailing the fight of female
guards in gaining access to careers in corrections, including the effect of Title VII in
making corrections careers available to women.
3. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).
567
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the right to privacy, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment,
and others—against the right of employees to be free from genderbased discrimination as guaranteed by Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.4
A pat search, sometimes referred to as a pat frisk, is a clothed
body search in which a correctional officer feels a prisoner’s clothed
body.5 Pat searches are an integral component of prison security,
allowing the prison to detect and control contraband.6 One prison
training manual, describing a pat search of a female inmate, in
structed a guard
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). While this Note discusses the issue in terms of
cross-gender pat searches, the conflict itself is not so limited. This conflict will arise
wherever prisoner privacy rights are at odds with employment determinations.
The modern sensitivity to the significance of gender in American life and law
has made it inevitable that cases will arise where gender-based legal conten
tions conflict. This case arises in a context where that conflict can be expected
to recur with some frequency: privacy rights versus employment rights. Mem
bers of one sex assert a privacy right not to have their unclothed bodies viewed
by members of the opposite sex. At the same time, members of one sex assert
an employment right not to be discriminated against in job opportunities be
cause of their gender.
Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1211-12 (2d Cir. 1980).
5. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM
STATEMENT NUMBER 5521.05, SEARCHES OF HOUSING UNITS, INMATES, AND INMATE
WORK AREAS § 552.11(a), at 2 (1997); see STATE OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF COR
RECTIONAL SERVICES, DIRECTIVE NO. 4910, CONTROL OF & SEARCH FOR CONTRA
BAND § III(B)(1), at 2 (2001) (describing a “pat frisk” as “a search by hand of an
inmate’s person and his or her clothes while the inmate is clothed, except that the in
mate shall be required to remove coat, hat, and shoes”).
6. Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1099 (8th Cir. 1990) (“It is undisputed that pat
searches, both on a routine basis and prior to unannounced ‘cell shakedowns,’ are es
sential to maintaining proper prison security.”); Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 960
(7th Cir. 1983). While an argument may be made that pat searches are of decreasing
importance as new technologies in security take their place, this argument is non-essen
tial to the conclusion reached in this Note; as such the author has chosen to concede the
importance of pat-searches throughout.
The Federal Bureau of Prisons divides contraband into two categories, hard contra
band and nuisance contraband. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT NUMBER 5580.07, PERSONAL PROPERTY, INMATE
§ 553.12[b], at 10 (2005). “[H]ard contraband [is] any item which poses a serious threat
to the security of an institution[,] . . . includ[ing] weapons, intoxicants, and currency
(where prohibited).” Id. “[N]uisance contraband” is anything not hard contraband,
which is not currently authorized or which posses “a threat to security or its condition
or excessive quantities of it present a health, fire, or housekeeping hazard.” Id. at 11.
Examples of nuisance contraband include “excessive accumulation of commissary,
newspapers, letters, or magazines which cannot be stored neatly and safely in the desig
nated area; [as well as] food items which are spoiled or retained beyond the point of
safe consumption.” Id.
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to “[u]se a flat hand and pushing motion across the [inmate’s]
crotch area.” The guard must “[p]ush inward and upward when
searching the crotch and upper thighs of the inmate.” All seams
in the leg and the crotch area are to be “squeez[ed] and
knead[ed].” Using the back of the hand, the guard also is to
search the breast area in a sweeping motion, so that the breasts
will be “flattened.”7

A cross-gender pat search is, as the name implies, a pat search
performed by a prison staff member of the opposite sex.8 Because
of the inherently personal nature of having a member of the oppo
site sex feeling a prisoners’ body, numerous challenges have arisen
to this practice within the last few decades.9
In June 2009, the National Prison Rape Elimination Act
(PREA) Commission brought this issue to the forefront with the
issuance of proposed standards meant to eliminate rape and sexual
abuse in prisons.10 The Commission, recognizing the increased op
7. Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1523 (9th Cir. 1993) (alterations in original)
(citations omitted).
8. Brenda V. Smith, Watching You, Watching Me, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 225,
229, 259-62 (2003). A 2001 Federal Bureau of Prisons training video instructs officers
on how to perform cross-gender pat searches. DVD: Federal Bureau of Prisons
Presents Pat Search Procedures (Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Prisons
2001) (on file with author). First the video depicts a male officer searching a female
inmate. Id. To search the inmate’s breast area, the officer stands at her side. Id. With
one hand guarding his crotch area, the officer places his other hand vertically along the
inmate’s breast bone with the back of his hand facing towards her breast. Id. He then
runs his hand down circling under the breast and upwards towards the armpit area
applying sufficient “pressure to detect any contraband.” Id. To search the groin area
the officer stands to the side of the inmate, and, with her arm raised, he places his “palm
flat on the lower abdomen with the fingers aligned with the zipper.” Id. The officer’s
other hand is placed flat, palm facing inwards, “below the waistband on the buttocks.”
Id. In a continuous, circular sweeping motion the officer “run[s] both hands from the
starting point to the ankle area, “with special” attention paid to “seams, waistbands,
zippers and buttons.” Id.
A cross-gender pat search of a man is done principally while standing facing the
inmates back with his arms raised. Id. The corrections officer searches the chest and
abdomen areas by standing behind the inmate and reaching her arms around and feel
ing down his front. Id. To further search the lower abdomen, groin, and shoe areas, the
officer moves to a position “slightly to the side [and rear] of the inmate.” Id. The
officer places her “palm flat, . . . one hand directly below the waistband with fingers
aligned with the zipper [and] [t]he other hand, palm flat, directly below the waistband
on the buttocks.” Id. She then uses a continuous circular sweeping motion down to the
foot, “pay[ing] special attention to the inmate’s lower abdomen and groin.” Id.
9. Smith, supra note 8, at 259-62.
10. NATIONAL PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM., REPORT 1 (June 2009) [here
inafter PREA REPORT]. The Commission was formed as a result of the Prison Rape
Elimination Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C. § 15606 (2006). “The Commission . . . carr[ied] out a
comprehensive legal and factual study of the penalogical, physical, mental, medical, so
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portunity for sexual assault during cross-gender supervision, called
for the cessation of non-emergency cross-gender pat searches.11
The PREA Commission’s proposed standards went to the Attorney
General for consideration in enacting final Prison Rape Elimination
Act standards.12
The PREA Commission is not the only group to recognize a
need for change in this area. The American Bar Association
(ABA) recently adopted a new edition of its Standards on the
Treatment of Prisoners.13 One new standard limits cross-gender pat
searches to emergency situations.14 In a memorandum to the ABA
Criminal Justice Council and interested parties explaining the ratio
nale for the proposed (now adopted) changes, Professor Margo
Schlanger noted that “cross-gender searches have grave implica
tions for the privacy interests of prisoners, and allow access to pris
oners’ bodies in ways that can be abused.”15
On February 3, 2011, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
promulgated its own set of proposed Prison Rape Elimination Act
standards.16 The DOJ standard on cross-gender supervision allows
cial, and economic impacts of prison rape in the United States.” Id. § 15606(d)(1).
Based on its findings, the Commission released a report with “recommended national
standards for reducing prison rape”; “recommended protocols for preserving evidence
and treating victims of prison rape; and” a “summary of all materials relied on by the
Commission” when preparing its report. Id. § 15606(d)(3)(B).
11. PREA REPORT, supra note 10, at 62-63. “Except in the case of emergency or
other extraordinary or unforeseen circumstances, the facility restricts nonmedical staff
from viewing inmates of the opposite gender who are nude or performing bodily func
tions and similarly restricts cross-gender pat-down searches.” NATIONAL PRISON RAPE
ELIMINATION COMM., STANDARDS FOR THE PREVENTION, DETECTION, RESPONSE, AND
MONITORING OF SEXUAL ABUSE IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS PP-4, at 11 (June 2009).
12. National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 76 Fed.
Reg. 6,248, 6,249 (proposed Feb. 3, 2011) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt 115) (“Pursuant
to PREA, the final rule adopting national standards ‘shall be based upon the indepen
dent judgment of the Attorney General, after giving due consideration to the recom
mended national standards provided by the Commission.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. at
15607(a)(2))).
13. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (THIRD) TREATMENT OF PRISON
ERS (2010), http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/treatmentprisoners.html.
14. Id. at #23-7.9(b) (“Except in exigent situations, a search of a prisoner’s body,
including a pat-down search or a visual search of the prisoner’s private bodily areas,
should be conducted by correctional staff of the same gender as the prisoner.”).
15. Memorandum from Margo Schlanger, Rep., Task Force on Treatment of Pris
oners, to American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section 28 (June 12, 2009) (on file
with author). Professor Schlanger also noted that “[t]he PREA Commission invested
substantial time into documenting the resulting problems, and developing solutions.
This proposed Standard matches the pending PREA standards on this point.” Id.
16. National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 6,248. Upon receipt of the PREA Commission’s proposed standards “[t]he
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cross-gender pat searches in most circumstances.17 In justifying its
decision not to adopt the PREA Commission’s proposal prohibiting
cross-gender pat searches the DOJ expressed “concern[ ] about the
high cost of imposing such a general requirement, and the concomi
tant effect on employment opportunities for women.”18 Further
more, it noted that “many agencies expressed concern that the
necessary adjustments to their workforce could violate Federal or
State equal employment laws.”19 The commentary period on the
DOJ standards will end in early April, at which time further revi
sions may be made before a final set of standards become law for
detention facilities around the country.20
In light of the determination by influential groups, including
the PREA Commission21 and the ABA,22 that cross-gender pat
searches be limited to emergency circumstances, why has this policy
not been abolished? As the DOJ’s proposed Prison Rape Elimina
tion Act standards reflect, the answer lies largely in the effect a
prohibition could have on prison employment practices, particularly
for women working in men’s prisons.23 Pat searches are a principle
Attorney General established a PREA Working Group, chaired by the Office of the
Deputy Attorney General, to review each of the Commission’s proposed standards and
to help him prepare a draft final rule.” Id. at 6,249.
17. See id. at 6278. There is an exemption available, however, for those inmates
who can show that they have suffered from prior cross-gender sexual victimization
while incarcerated. Id. (“[T]he agency shall implement procedures to exempt from
non-emergency cross-gender pat-down searches those inmates who have suffered docu
mented prior cross-gender sexual abuse while incarcerated.”). The proposed standards
also provide that an “agency shall train security staff in how to conduct cross-gender
pat-down searches . . . in a professional and respectful manner, and in the least intrusive
manner possible, consistent with security needs.” Id. As will be discussed in greater
detail later in this note, neither of these provisions are sufficient to address the numer
ous concerns resulting from cross-gender pat searches. See supra notes 85-94 (discussing a case where the Ninth Circuit found a violation of the Eighth Amendment because
of the effects cross-gender pat searches can have on women who were sexually victim
ized prior to incarceration); supra note 275 (discussing why cross-gender pat searches
can lead to Constitutional violations even when performed professionally).
18. National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 6,253.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 6248. Final standards adopted by the Attorney General will be promul
gated to the states within ninety days of publication and will be immediately applicable
to the Federal Bureau of Prisons. 42 U.S.C. § 15607 (2006). Any state that does not
comply with the final national standards risks will have its federal funding cut by 5%.
Id. § 15607(c)(2).
21. Supra note 11 and accompanying text.
22. Supra notes 15-17.
23. Supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text; see Rebecca Jurado, The Essence
of Her Womanhood: Defining The Privacy Rights of Women Prisoners and the Employ
ment Rights of Women Guards, 7 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 39 (1999)
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means of detecting contraband.24 Disallowing cross-gender pat
searches would arguably prevent guards of one gender from effec
tively performing their job. “If a state is required to hire women as
guards in its male prisons, it reasonably seems to follow that it must
be allowed to utilize female guards to the fullest extent possible.”25
This Note considers the conflicting interests presented by pris
oners in not being subjected to cross-gender pat searches and by
corrections officers in not being discriminated against in employ
ment opportunities. Ultimately, this Note argues that an inmate’s
rights, including Constitutional rights under the Fourth and Eighth
Amendments, take precedence, and therefore, cross-gender pat
searches should only be performed during emergencies. There are
solutions, however, that respect inmate rights while preserving em
ployment opportunities for both male and female correctional staff.
To the extent possible, these solutions must be pursued prior to im
plementation of a bona fide occupational qualification, thereby pre
serving the rights of both prisoners and corrections officers.
In Part I, this Note discusses various prisoners’ rights impli
cated by the use of cross-gender pat searches. In Part II, this Note
turns to the rights of corrections officers in light of Title VII. Part
III examines the conflicting rights and reaches the conclusion that
inmate rights take precedence, and therefore, non-emergency crossgender pat searches should be prohibited. Finally, Part IV analyzes
the viability of prior solutions and briefly suggests various policies
that may be implemented, given a prohibition on non-emergency
cross-gender pat searches, to protect employment opportunities.

(“When male prisoners have asserted their right to bodily privacy, the rights of the male
prisoners have lost to the employment rights of female guards.”); Teresa A. Miller,
Keeping the Government’s Hands Off Our Bodies: Mapping a Feminist Legal Theory
Approach to Privacy in Cross-Gender Prison Searches, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 861, 880
81 (2001) (“In balancing the penological objectives of prison officials against the privacy
interest of prisoners, courts have generally held that the expectation of privacy for male
prisoners is low and that the penological objective of eliminating discrimination against
women in staff pursuant to Title VII mandate is high.”).
24. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM
STATEMENT 5500.12 CORRECTIONAL SERVICES PROCEDURES MANUAL § 208(3), at 10
(2003); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM
STATEMENT 5521.05 SEARCHES OF HOUSING UNITS, INMATES, AND INMATE WORK AR
EAS § 552.11(a), at 2 (1997) (stating that “[s]taff may conduct a pat search of an inmate
on a routine or random basis to control contraband”); cf. id. § 552.11(b), at 3 (requiring
a reasonable belief of contraband, or a good opportunity to conceal contraband before
performing a visual (strip) search).
25. Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52, 54 (7th Cir. 1982).
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BIG DEAL?

Cross-gender pat searches have been subjected to challenges
by prisoners on a number of grounds, many of which involve rights
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. “Prison walls
do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protec
tions of the Constitution.”26 As a result, “‘[w]hen a prison regula
tion or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee,
federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional
rights.’”27 Inmate claims are not limited to constitutional rights,
however. These claims may be based on federal statutes or state
constitutions. Prohibiting cross-gender pat searches may also be
justified based on a desire to avoid sexual assault by prison staff.
A. Constitutional Claims Subject to the Turner v. Safley
Reasonableness Test
Constitutional claims brought by prisoners can be divided into
two categories. The first category, including the majority of consti
tutional claims, are those claims that are subject to a four-factor
“reasonableness” test set forth by the Supreme Court in Turner v.
Safley.28
In Turner, the Court struck the Eighth Circuit’s use of a strict
scrutiny standard in examining inmate constitutional rights.29 The
Court held that the use of a strict scrutiny test “would seriously
hamper the [prison administration’s] ability to anticipate security
problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable
problems” facing them.30
Instead, the Court applied an analysis that determines whether
a prison regulation “is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests.”31 In evaluating the reasonableness of a prison regula
tion, the Court established a four-factor balancing test: (1) whether
26. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). A prisoner retains, for instance, the
right to be free from discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
27. Id. (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974)).
28. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1530 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that
the Supreme Court has applied the standard in Turner to “‘all circumstances in which
the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights’” (quoting Washing
ton v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990))). This four-factor test will heretofore be re
ferred to as the “Turner test.”
29. Turner, 482 U.S. at 81. In Turner, inmates challenged the constitutionality of
two prison practices: one limiting the ability of inmates to send mail to inmates in other
institutions, and the other limiting the ability of two inmates to marry. Id.
30. Id. at 89.
31. Id.
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there is “a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regula
tion and the legitimate governmental interest”; (2) “whether there
are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to
prison inmates”; (3) “the impact accommodation of the asserted
constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on
the allocation of prison resources generally”; and (4) the existence
of any “ready alternatives” as an indicator of the reasonableness of
the regulation.32
1. First Amendment Challenges
The First Amendment of the Constitution guarantees, among
other rights, the free exercise of religion.33 The First Amendment
limits not only those burdens imposed by the federal government,
but also those imposed by the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.34 As a result, “reasonable opportunities must be af
forded to all prisoners to exercise the religious freedom guaranteed
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”35 In fact, religion is
often encouraged for prisoners because of its potential rehabilita
tive effects.36
Because of the importance that Congress placed on religion for
inmates, it enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), and later, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA).37 These federal statutes require the gov
ernment to meet a much higher compelling government interest
standard as opposed to the Turner reasonableness standard when
enacting policies that infringe on an inmate’s religious freedoms.38
As a result, those inmates who have a First Amendment claim
would do better to bring a claim under either RFRA or RLUIPA.
Since courts do not decide a constitutional issue when a case can be
32. Id. at 89-90.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
34. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb-1, as recognized in Allah v. Menei, 84 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
35. Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 958 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting Cruz, 405 U.S.
at 322 n.2) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. See Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and Constitu
tionality of RLUIPA’s Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 510-11
(2005) (citing hearing testimony that “[r]eligious observance by prisoners . . . cut recidi
vism rates by two-thirds”). See generally Cruz, 405 U.S. at 319-20 (noting that the
prison in question encouraged participation in certain religions, even awarding points of
good merit to prisoners who attended religious services).
37. See infra notes 107-128 and accompanying text for a discussion of religious
challenges to cross-gender pat searches under RFRA and RLUIPA.
38. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
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decided on a statutory basis,39 while an inmate may have a claim
that cross-gender pat searches violate his or her First Amendment
rights, this issue is unlikely to be decided—making religiously based
First Amendment challenges to cross-gender pat searches a largely
academic matter.40
2. Fourth Amendment Challenges
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution pro
tects citizens from “unreasonable searches and seizures,”41 making
it an obvious choice for those inmates looking to challenge crossgender pat searches.42 These claims also offer the clearest legiti
39. Forde v. Baird, 720 F. Supp. 2d 170, 182 (D. Conn. 2010) (“Because courts
generally do not reach constitutional issues if a case can be resolved on statutory
grounds, and because the Court finds a violation of RFRA, it need not reach the consti
tutional question of whether FCI Danbury’s policy violates the First Amendment.”).
Conversely, if the court did not find a violation of RFRA, using a compelling govern
ment interest test, it would not have found a violation of the Turner reasonableness
standard under the First Amendment either.
40. This statement should not be read to suggest, however, that cross-gender pat
searches do not violate the First Amendment. Rather, all that is meant is that the
courts are unlikely to decide this issue while RFRA and RLUIPA are ready
alternatives.
In a Connecticut District Court summary judgment decision, regarding whether
cross-gender pat searches violated a Muslim inmate’s religious freedoms under both
RFRA and the First Amendment, the district court did not grant summary judgment on
the First Amendment issue. Forde v. Zickefoose, 612 F. Supp. 2d 171, 180-81 (D. Conn.
2009). Instead, the district court found that there were remaining issues of material fact
regarding whether a rational relationship existed between the asserted penological in
terests of security and employment and cross-gender pat searches. Id. The court found
compelling that FCI Danbury had provided a blanket exemption to cross-gender pat
searches in the past “with little or no impact on employment.” Id. The court further
stated that FCI Danbury had “provided no evidence that exempting even the small
group of other observant Muslim women would disrupt prison policy.” Id. Finally,
there had been no evidence produced to show that other Muslim women had the same
sincerely held religious belief against cross-gender pat searches, and therefore there had
been no basis for a finding that exempting Ms. Forde would have a widespread effect on
prison security. Id. Because of the remaining factual uncertainties, the court held that
FCI Danbury had “not adequately demonstrated that the challenged practice furthers a
legitimate penological objective.” Id.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
42. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1541 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring) (stating that, in his opinion, the Fourth Amendment was the appropriate
basis on which to decide the case because “[t]here can be no doubt that the question
whether the particular type of search involved here is constitutional implicates the
fourth amendment”); Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52, 53 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding that a
constitutional protection from cross-gender pat searches “would likely be found, if at
all, in the Fourth Amendment guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches or the
more general right of personal privacy which has been recognized as implicit in that
Amendment”).
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mate penological interest for prisons, however, because of the nec
essary relinquishment of certain privacy rights by inmates upon
entering incarceration.43 The determination of whether a crossgender pat search violates an inmate’s Fourth Amendment right to
privacy can turn on factors including the scope of the pat search44
and the gender of the inmate.45
In Timm v. Gunter, the Eighth Circuit applied the Turner test
to a claim by male inmates that cross-gender pat searches violated
their Fourth Amendment right to privacy.46 The prison asserted a
legitimate penological interest in fulfilling the requirements of Title
VII.47 The court stated that “[t]he administrators at [the Nebraska
State Penitentiary] must weigh the rights of the prisoners, the equal
employment rights of both the female guards and the male guards,
and the institutional need for internal security.”48
While pat searches are necessary in maintaining prison secur
ity,49 the appropriate question is whether a pat search performed by
a member of the opposite sex is unreasonable.50 The Eighth Circuit
found probative that all employees “are trained to perform pat
searches in a professional manner,” and that most inmates do not
object to cross-gender pat searches.51 Based on these factors, the
court concluded that the privacy rights of some inmates “must give
43. Smith, 678 F.2d at 54 (referring to privacy rights as “[o]ne of the most impor
tant rights which is necessarily limited as a result of one’s incarceration”).
44. See generally Smith, 678 F.2d 52. In Smith a male inmate claimed that being
forced to submit to cross-gender pat searches violated his constitutional rights. Id. at
53. The Seventh Circuit recognized that submitting to a pat search can “be a humiliat
ing and degrading experience” and that having it performed by a member of the oppo
site sex could exacerbate the feelings of degradation. Id. The court further recognized
that despite “the right of one sex not to be discriminated against in job opportunities
within the prison because of their gender . . . inmates do have some right to avoid
unwanted intrusions by persons of the opposite sex.” Id. at 55. The Seventh Circuit
held, however, that Smith’s right to privacy had not been violated because the pat
searches in question did not involve the anal or genital areas. Id. In reaching its con
clusion, the Seventh Circuit distinguished Smith from Sterling v. Cupp, where an inmate
had successfully argued that cross-gender pat searches involving the genitalia violated
his rights under the Oregon State Constitution. Id. at 55; see Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d
123, 126 (Or. 1981).
45. See infra notes 46-67 and accompanying text, examining both a male inmate’s
Fourth Amendment claim and a female inmate’s Fourth Amendment claim.
46. Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1099 (8th Cir. 1990).
47. Id. at 1098.
48. Id. at 1099.
49. See supra note 6.
50. Timm, 917 F.2d at 1100. The fact that pat searches are important does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that cross-gender pat searches are also necessary. See
infra notes 117-118 and accompanying text.
51. Timm, 917 F.2d at 1100.
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way to the use of [cross-gender] pat searches” because the prison’s
interests in equal employment rights and security are more
important.52
The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that there is not an alterna
tive way for prisoners to practice their constitutional privacy
rights.53 The court found that accommodation of the rights would
have more than a de minimis effect on prison resources, and would
be a great burden on both the guards and on prison resources as a
whole.54 The court concluded that a prison administrator could
choose to accommodate an inmate’s request for privacy, but that
there is no constitutional requirement that he do so.55
A different conclusion entirely was reached in Colman v. Vas
quez, a suit involving a female inmate’s claim that cross-gender pat
searches violated her Fourth Amendment privacy rights.56 Ms. Colman was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI)
in Danbury, where she was placed in a special unit for victims of
sexual assault.57 While in the sexual trauma unit she was forced to
submit to pat searches by male guards.58 During one pat search,
Ms. Colman alleged that Corrections Officer Vasquez made inap
propriate advances of a sexual nature.59 Despite the fact that Ms.
Colman alerted several FCI Danbury staff to the inappropriate be
havior, the harassment continued for several months, ending in
March of 1997 with a physical assault.60
Ms. Colman brought suit alleging that the cross-gender pat
searches violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from un
reasonable searches.61 The United States District Court of Con
necticut stated that Ms. Colman retained “some limited Fourth
Amendment right to bodily privacy.”62 The Connecticut District
Court distinguished Ms. Colman’s case from prior cross-gender pat
search cases on two grounds: first, the court noted that none of the
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. For a further discussion on the role of prison administrators’ discretion in
balancing these competing interests, see infra notes 285-299 and accompanying text.
56. Colman v. Vasquez, 142 F. Supp. 2d 226, 226 (D. Conn. 2001).
57. Id. at 229.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 230. Ms. Colman also alleged a violation of her Eighth Amendment
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, violation of the Violence Against
Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981, and various state tort claims. Id. at 228-30.
62. Id. at 231.
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other cases had been decided solely on the pleadings; second, and
more importantly, the court distinguished this case because it in
volved a female inmate who had been placed in a special unit for
victims of sexual trauma.63
Female inmates’ privacy rights have been viewed by a number
of courts as being “qualitatively different than the same rights as
serted by male inmates.”64 In Colman, the Connecticut District
Court found that the genders of Ms. Colman and Corrections Of
ficer Vasquez were relevant to determining whether Ms. Colman’s
privacy rights had been violated.65 The court justified a genderbased determination because “‘women experience unwanted inti
mate touching by men differently from men subject to comparable
touching by women.’”66 The court ruled that judgment should not
be granted on the pleadings because to do so “would require a find
ing that all types of pat searches are generically lawful, without in
quiry into the nature of the search, the circumstances of the
inmates, or the penological justifications for the particular policy at
issue.”67
3. Fourteenth Amendment Challenges
Many states have already decided not to use cross-gender pat
searches in female institutions.68 Part of the rationale behind this
decision may be the perception that men and women experience
unwanted touching differently.69 Distinguishing between male and
female inmates based on gender alone serves as the basis for a
claim of discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment.70
In Madyun v. Franzen, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that
the Department of Corrections treated inmates differently based on
gender,71 subjecting male inmates to cross-gender pat searches, but
63. Id.
64. Id. at 232.
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993)).
67. Id. at 232.
68. See infra Table 1. Three states and the District of Columbia prohibit crossgender pat searches in female institutions, another twenty-five states allow cross-gender
pat searches of female inmates only in emergency circumstances. See infra Table 1.
69. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
70. See Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 962 (7th Cir. 1983) (“The Fourteenth
Amendment requires that any gender-based distinction drawn by the state ‘must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives.’” (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976))).
71. Id. at 962.
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exempting female inmates.72 The Seventh Circuit held, however,
that “the state’s justification for the disparity is as manifest as the
disparity in treatment itself.”73
The justification the Seventh Circuit found compelling was not
based on the gender of the inmate, but rather, was based on the
gender of the corrections officer.74 The Seventh Circuit held that
the gender distinction served an important role in equalizing job
opportunities for women in corrections.75 It would not have been
feasible for the prison to hire women if they could not perform pat
searches; therefore, cross-gender pat searching male inmates pro
tects female employment opportunities.76 There was no need for a
similar pat search policy for female inmates as there had been “no
indication that males have suffered a lack of opportunity to serve as
prison guards because they are precluded from frisk searching fe
male inmates.”77
B. Constitutional Claims Not Subject to Turner v. Safley–The
Eighth Amendment
The Supreme Court has stated that the Turner test, which pro
vides a deferential level of review to actions by prison administra
tors,78 is applicable whenever “the needs of prison administration
implicate constitutional rights.”79 The Ninth Circuit has held, how
ever, that the Turner test was meant only to apply to those rights
that are shared by all citizens, inmates, and non-inmates alike, and
not to Eighth Amendment claims.80 The decision in Turner in
volved rights that “may necessarily be limited due to the unique
circumstances of imprisonment.”81 The Eighth Amendment is
unique in that it “do[es] not conflict with incarceration”; instead it
applies only to incarcerated persons, ensuring that they are not sub
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
79. Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1530 (9th Cir. 1993).
80. Id.
81. Id. An example is where constitutional rights to privacy are asserted. Id.
There is a “legitimate [and necessary] penological interest[ ]” in monitoring inmates,
therefore privacy is a right that necessarily conflicts with the unique circumstances of
imprisonment. Id. at 1530, 1535; see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546-47 (1979) (up
holding cell shake-down and visual body cavity searches as not violating constitutional
rights to privacy because maintaining institutional security is an essential goal).
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jected to “cruel and unusual punishments.”82 To show a violation
of the Eighth Amendment, an inmate must establish that “there is
an infliction of pain, and . . . that [the] infliction [of pain] is unneces
sary and wanton.”83
Jordan v. Gardner is one of the most startling examples of an
Eighth Amendment claim resulting from cross-gender pat
searches.84 Jordan involved an all-female institution where approx
imately 85% of the inmates reported a history of sexual assault to
prison counselors “including rapes, molestations, beatings, and slav
ery.”85 In 1989, a new superintendent instituted cross-gender pat
searches for two reasons: to improve prison security, and to avoid
“an eventual lawsuit by the female guards.”86 Prior to implementa
tion of the cross-gender pat searches, prison psychologists warned
the superintendent that these “searches could cause severe emo
tional distress in some inmates”; despite the warnings, the policy
was implemented on July 5, 1989.87
The policy remained in effect for only one day because of the
extreme reactions of some inmates.88 One inmate “had to have her
fingers pried loose from bars she had grabbed during the search,
and she vomited after returning to her cell block.”89 In issuing a
permanent injunction against these searches, the district court had
over 1,000 pages of trial testimony transcripts, 300 court documents,
82. Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1530-31. The Jordan court also notes that “the Supreme
Court has never applied Turner to an Eighth Amendment case.” Id. at 1530.
83. Id. at 1525 (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. Id. at 1521; see also Colman v. Vasquez, 142 F. Supp. 2d 226, 234 (D. Conn.
2001) (involving a claim brought by an inmate assigned to the sexual trauma unit at FCI
Danbury where the court found that “some aspects of [the inmate’s] claim resonate
under the Eighth Amendment . . . to the extent the searches are alleged to have caused
extreme emotional distress due to her circumstances as a sexually traumatized wo
man”). The inmate in Colman also brought a Fourth Amendment claim. Supra notes
56-67 and accompanying text.
85. Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1523, 1525. While the 85% reported in this case is very
high, the prominence of women who have histories of abuse, both physical and sexual,
is startling. In a 1999 survey by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 57.2% of female state
prison inmates had been abused prior to incarceration, of those 46.5% had been physi
cally abused and 39% had been sexually abused. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S.
DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, PRIOR ABUSE REPORTED BY INMATES AND PROBATIONERS 2, Table
1 (1999), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/parip.pdf.
86. Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1523.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. This same inmate later settled a lawsuit arising from this incident against
the guard and prison officials for $1,000, with an additional $10,000 in attorneys’ fees.
Id. at 1523 n.2.
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videotapes, six days of live testimony, and fifty-six exhibits.90 In
affirming the judgment of the trial court, the Ninth Circuit included
in its opinion summaries of inmate testimony regarding histories of
sexual abuse.91
In determining whether there was pain, the Ninth Circuit
looked both at the fact that many of the inmates had histories of
sexual or physical abuse, and at the fact “that physical, emotional,
and psychological differences between men and women ‘may well
cause women, and especially physically and sexually abused wo
men, to react differently to searches of this type than would male
inmates subjected to similar searches by women.’”92 Findings sup
ported the idea that there was a high risk of great harm, including
emotional pain and suffering and severe psychological injury even
where the searches were conducted properly.93 Specifically, the
court was worried about feelings of re-victimization that could re
sult from “unwilling submission to bodily contact with the breasts
and genitals.”94 The Ninth Circuit concluded that “[t]he record . . .
support[ed] the postulate that women experience unwanted inti
mate touching by men differently from men subject to comparable
90. Id. at 1523-24.
91. Id. at 1525. These testimonies included an inmate whose “husband beat her,
strangled her, and ran over her with a truck”; an inmate who “was frequently strapped
or handcuffed to a bed” while being beaten or raped by her half-brother; another in
mate who had been impregnated by her uncle at the age of sixteen who then attempted
an impromptu abortion with a broom handle; and yet another inmate who had been
raped, starved, and beaten by various men in her life. Id.
92. Id. (quoting Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law at 3, Jordan v. Gardner,
No. C89-339TB (W.D.Wash. Feb. 28, 1990)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1526. Even the proper performance of these pat searches was such that
the district court refused to call them “pat searches.” Judge Reinhardt in his concurring
opinion stated:
While some modifications to the procedure may have occurred, the descrip
tions by the prison personnel and inmates, the training material, and a video
tape viewed by this court reveal that the searches involve nothing so delicate
or so tentative as “patting.” Rather, the searches are intimate and deeply
invasive.
Id. at 1533 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). For a description of the pat searches in this case,
see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
The DOJ proposed standard on cross-gender supervision would provide a limited
exemption for those inmates who could show documented evidence of cross-gender
sexual assault while incarcerated. National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond
to Prison Rape, 76 Fed. Reg. 6,248, 6,289 (proposed Feb. 3, 2011) (to be codified at 28
C.F.R. pt. 115). This standard, while a good first step, does not prevent feelings of revictimization for any of the women reporting instances of sexual abuse prior to incar
ceration. See supra note 85.
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touching by women”; therefore, “the cross-gender clothed body
search policy constituted ‘infliction of pain.’”95
The Ninth Circuit then examined the prison’s justifications for
the policy to determine whether the infliction of pain had been “un
necessary and wanton.”96 The court found that the cross-gender
pat searches were not essential to prison security because there was
no evidence showing that security had been impaired since the pre
liminary injunctive relief had been implemented.97
While employment concerns had been a sufficient legitimate
governmental concern in prior cases involving constitutional
claims,98 they were not here.99 The court distinguished Eighth
Amendment claims, stating that “[i]t appears that none of the
Eighth Amendment cases decided by the Supreme Court, this cir
cuit, or any other court of appeals has upheld a pain-inflicting mea
sure simply because prison officials implemented the policy to
‘address’ a legitimate governmental interest.”100 Since there was
not a government interest sufficient to sustain the use of cross-gen
der pat searches, they were “unnecessary.”101
The Ninth Circuit then found that the superintendent exercised
wantonness in that he had been deliberately indifferent to the pain
being caused to the inmates.102 The court acknowledged that he
had been concerned about a potential lawsuit from the union, but,
“[t]he wish to avoid a lawsuit from an employees’ union . . . does
95. Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1526; see also Colman v. Vasquez, 142 F. Supp. 2d 226, 236
(D. Conn. 2001). In Colman, the court held that cross-gender pat searches of women in
the sexual trauma unit may meet the “deliberately indifferent” standard found in condi
tions of confinement cases and therefore dismissal on the pleadings was inappropriate.
Id. at 235-37. At the same time, the court acknowledged that Ms. Colman would need
to show “extreme emotional distress” “[b]ecause routine discomfort is ‘part of the pen
alty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Id. at 236 (quoting
Sims v. Artuz, 230 F.3d 14, 20 (2d Cir. 2000)).
96. Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1526.
97. Id. at 1526-27.
98. See Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 962 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that em
ployment concerns justify making gender based distinctions in deciding a male inmate’s
Fourteenth Amendment claim); Forde v. Zickefoose, 612 F. Supp. 2d 171, 181 (D.
Conn. 2009) (holding that avoiding employment problems is a legitimate penological
interest in response to an inmate’s First Amendment claim); see also infra Part II (dis
cussing employment concerns further).
99. Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1527.
100. Id. It is interesting to compare the language, stating that a legitimate gov
ernmental interest is not sufficient with the first factor of the Turner standard, which
looks specifically for a rational relation to a legitimate governmental interest. Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
101. Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1527.
102. Id. at 1528-29.
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not provide a justification for inflicting pain of a constitutional mag
nitude.”103 That the superintendent had instituted the policy for a
good reason, to avoid a lawsuit, was not sufficient justification to
avoid being labeled as having acted wantonly.104 The court held
that he neglected his responsibility to “afford sufficient weight to
the constitutional rights of individuals,”105 resulting in “a lack of
proper concern for the serious infringement of a countervailing
constitutional interest.”106
C. Federal Claims Not Based on the Constitution
Inmate claims against cross-gender pat searches can originate
from sources other than the Constitution. An inmate who has a
claim under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, for in
stance, may also have a claim under either RFRA107 or RLUIPA.108
Both RFRA and RLUIPA require any substantial burden placed
on the exercise of religion to be justified by a compelling govern
ment interest implemented in the least restrictive manner.109
103. Id. at 1529.
104. Id.
105. Id. The court held that “[i]f a prison administrator decides to ignore grave
suffering because of irrelevant or unimportant concerns, that administrator demon
strates a deliberate indifference to the harm being done and to the constitutional princi
ple at stake.” Id. This holding, referring to potential employment discrimination
litigation as an “irrelevant or unimportant concern” is only seen in this case, and may
well be a result of the unique facts presented. See id.
106. Id. at 1530.
107. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006).
108. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc-1 (2006). If an inmate is in a state institution, as opposed to a federal institu
tion, they may not bring a claim under RFRA, which has been struck down by the
Supreme Court as unconstitutional when applied to the states. City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that RFRA, as applied to the states, exceeded con
gressional authority to enact legislation under Section five of the Fourteenth Amend
ment); see also Forde v. Baird, 720 F. Supp. 2d 170, 175 (D. Conn. 2010) (“Although the
Supreme Court held that Congress exceeded its authority in making RFRA applicable
against state and local governments, the Court also confirmed RFRA’s validity as ap
plied to actions of the federal government.” (citation omitted)). RLUIPA, however,
has not been found unconstitutional, and unlike RFRA, it explicitly references protec
tions for institutionalized persons. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. RLUIPA states that:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a
person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that
imposition of the burden on that person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling government interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.
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Under either RFRA or RLUIPA, “[a] substantial burden exists
where the state ‘puts substantial pressure on an adherent to modify
his behavior and to violate his beliefs.’”110 A RFRA or RLUIPA
claim allows an inmate to avoid the stringent Turner standards that
apply to a First Amendment claim.
In Forde v. Baird, Forde, an observant Sunni Muslim, brought
a claim that FCI Danbury’s cross-gender pat search policy violated
her religious rights under RFRA.111 FCI Danbury alleged that the
practice did not place a substantial burden on Forde’s religious free
doms because submission to cross-gender pat searches is involun
tary, and she was therefore not permitting a man outside her family
to touch her.112 The district court rejected this argument.113 Forde
produced evidence that cross-gender pat searches violated her sin
cerely held religious beliefs, and “[t]he opinions of the . . . [prison’s]
religious authorities cannot trump the plaintiff’s sincere and relig
ious belief.”114 In response, the prison “allege[d] two compelling
governmental interests . . . (1) maintaining the safety and security of
the facility and (2) avoiding staffing and employment problems.”115
Regarding FCI Danbury’s interest in safety and security, the
district court referred to the argument as “a strawman” in that it
“focuse[d] on the pat search component of cross-gender pat
searches, rather than the cross-gender component of those
searches.”116 FCI Danbury did not satisfy its burden of proving
that pat searches of Forde by male officers served security interests,
it merely argued that pat searches generally serve a compelling gov
ernmental interest.117
Indeed, Forde presented evidence showing that there may be pe
nological disadvantages to cross-gender pat searches due to the
possibility of falsified reports of sexual harassment lodged against
110. Forde v. Zickefoose, 612 F. Supp. 2d 171, 177 (D. Conn. 2009) (quoting Jolly
v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 477 (2d Cir. 1996)).
111. Forde v. Baird, 720 F. Supp. 2d 170, 171-72 (D. Conn. 2010). Ms. Forde’s
claim was brought under RFRA because she was housed at an institution run by the
Federal Bureau of Prisons. Id. at 172-76. Ms. Forde also brought her claim under the
First Amendment. See supra note 40.
112. Forde, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 176.
113. Id. (“To conclude that Forde is mistaken regarding whether her religious
beliefs are offended by cross-gender pat searches—and therefore hold that her free
exercise rights have not been substantially burdened—would contravene clear
precedent.”).
114. Id. at 177 (quoting Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 590 (2d Cir. 2003)).
115. Id. at 177-78.
116. Id. at 178.
117. Id.
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male correctional officers by female inmates and the possibility
that male officers would pat search female inmates less thor
oughly to avoid such false claims—an assertion that [FCI Danbury] contested, though failed to disprove.118

The district court then held that FCI Danbury had “not pre
sent[ed] persuasive evidence that . . . staffing and employment is
sues present a compelling governmental interest.”119 Specifically it
had “offered no evidence that granting Forde an exemption from
non-emergency cross-gender pat searches would lead FCI Danbury
to violate Title VII at all.”120
Even assuming that FCI Danbury had managed to provide evi
dence supporting either its security or staffing concerns, it had not
shown that “cross-gender pat searches of Forde [were] the least re
strictive means of accomplishing those goals.”121 “Because the bur
den rests with the government, it is insufficient for [FCI Danbury]
to simply say that something cannot be done without exploring al
ternatives.”122 FCI Danbury failed to present any evidence at trial
that it had considered alternative means of accommodating Forde’s
religious freedom.123 Furthermore, FCI Danbury “failed to present
any evidence as to why many state penal institutions forbid nonemergency cross-gender pat searches, but [it] is incapable of doing
118. Id. Cross-gender pat searches increase the potential for allegations of sexual
assault. See infra notes 133-139 and accompanying text. An allegation of sexual assault
interferes with prison security because “[c]ompromised personnel . . . have been found
to have provided contraband to prisoners, accepted bribes, lied to federal investigators,
and committed other serious crimes as a result of their sexual involvement with federal
prisoners.” U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S EFFORTS TO PREVENT STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE OF FEDERAL
INMATES: SEPTEMBER 2009, i (2009) [hereinafter STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE], available at
http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/plus/e0904.pdf. Second, fearing an allegation of sex
ual assault, corrections officers may be more timid when performing a cross-gender pat
search and therefore the pat search itself may not be as effective. See Everson v. Mich.
Dep’t of Corrections, 391 F.3d 737, 745, 754 n. 24 (6th Cir. 2006) (three correctional
experts testified that male staff might be particularly hesitant to perform supervisory
duties of female inmates because of a “natural reluctance” resulting in a failure to “con
duct the security searches and procedures necessary” to control contraband in female
inmate living areas). Contra BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION
ACT (PREA) COST IMPACT ANALYSIS 14 (2010), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
programs/pdfs/preacostimpactanalysis.pdf (“There was a common sentiment that pat
downs were equally effective by either gender and potentially equally abused by either
gender.”).
119. Forde, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 179.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 180.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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the same.”124 While prison administrators are given due deference
in light of their expertise, FCI Danbury could not “simply claim
that the safety or security . . . [would] be negatively impacted . . .
without showing evidence of how the facility would be negatively
impacted.”125
Regarding FCI Danbury’s employment concerns, the district
court found compelling that “the vast majority of pat searches occur
at predictable times and places,” presumably making it easy to im
plement a plan accommodating Forde’s religious freedoms.126 In
response to FCI Danbury’s concern that gender-based shift assign
ments would violate either Title VII or the union contract the court
stated that “gender-based assignment of shifts, even where it pre
vents correctional officers from selecting preferred assignments, is a
‘minimal restriction’ that can be tolerated.”127 Because FCI Danbury had not met its burden to show that cross-gender pat searching
Forde was the least restrictive alternative for fulfilling a compelling
government interest, the court ordered the prison “to grant [Forde]
an individual exemption to the policy of non-emergency cross-gen
der pat searches.”128
D. Decreasing the Possibility for Sexual Assault
Each of the potential inmate claims discussed heretofore result
from the existence of the cross-gender pat search in and of itself,
and would exist regardless of whether the pat search was performed
professionally. The use of cross-gender pat searches, however, also
increases the risk of sexual assault by corrections staff against in
mates.129 In 2003, Congress passed the Prison Rape Elimination
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 181.
127. Id. (citing Tipler v. Douglas Cnty., 482 F.3d 1023, 1027 (8th Cir. 2007);
Robino v. Iranon, 145 F.3d 1109, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998); Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521,
1539 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J. concurring)). “[E]ven if male employment rights at
FCI Danbury might collide with Forde’s free exercise rights, those employment rights
would not necessarily prevail.” Id. at 182. Where employment concerns collide with
constitutional rights, resolution “‘requires a careful inquiry as to whether the competing
interests can be satisfactorily accommodated before deciding whether one interest must
be vindicated to the detriment of the other.’” Id. (quoting Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210,
1212 (2d Cir. 1980)); see infra notes 285-300 (discussing the role of compromise in reconciling inmates’ rights to be free from cross-gender pat searches and correctional staff
employment rights).
128. Forde, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 182-83.
129. PREA REPORT, supra note 10, at 6-7 (explaining that while physical
searches, such as pat searches, are necessary “[t]he potential for abuse is heightened . . .
when staff of the opposite gender conduct them”).
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Act (PREA) “to protect incarcerated individuals from sexual
abuse.”130 Congress found that rape within prisons can have a
number of consequences, not the least of which is a potential viola
tion of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment.131 Statistics revealed in a 2009 study on staff sexual
abuse of federal inmates demonstrate the dangers inherent in al
lowing cross-gender pat searches.132
The information gathered in the report indicates that there
were more cross-gender allegations of sexually abusive behavior
than there were same-gender allegations.133 Of these, the number
of allegations against female staff by male inmates exceeded the
number involving male staff with female inmates.134 This was true,
despite the fact that only 26.5% of the staff was female.135
130. Id. at 1. Purposes of the act include “establish[ing] a zero-tolerance standard
for the incidence of prison rape in prisons in the United States,” and “mak[ing] the
prevention of prison rape a top priority in each prison system.” 42 U.S.C. § 15602
(2006).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 15601. In a 2009 report, the U.S. Department of Justice found
that:
Staff sexual abuse of prisoners has severe consequences for victims, under
mines the safety and security of prisons, and in some cases leads to other
crimes. Prisoners who are victims of staff sexual abuse may suffer physical
pain, fear, humiliation, degradation, and desperation, and this harm can last
beyond the victims’ incarceration.
STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 118, at i.
Furthermore, the OIG report raises the concern that female prisoners, who are
more likely to have histories of sexual abuse, can suffer even greater traumatization
when subjected to “further abuse inflicted by correctional staff while in [federal] cus
tody,” a concern that mirrors discussions above in regards to the Fourth and Eighth
Amendments. Id.; see supra notes 63-66, 84-95 and accompanying text.
132. STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 118. This study was based on data gathered pertaining to fiscal years 2001-2008. Id.
133. Id. at 30. Of the 1556 total allegations of sexual abuse, 62% were crossgender. Id. Allegations of sexual assault were broken into two categories, sexual
abuse, which involves criminal activity, and sexual misconduct, which is relegated to
relatively minor incidences such as “indecent language, gestures, or sexually oriented
visual surveillance.” Id. at 19. Sexual abuse was broken down into three categories,
aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse of a ward, and abusive sexual contact. Id. at 23.
Aggravated sexual abuse is “engaging in a sexual act with an inmate by threat or force,”
sexual abuse of a ward is “engaging in a sexual act with an inmate.” Id.
In total there were 1585 allegations of inappropriate sexual behavior by staff to
wards inmates, and of these, 65% (1,028) alleged sexual abuse. Id. at 20. The number
of allegations included in this statistic more than doubled between 2001 and 2008,
meaning that the rate of increase in allegations of staff sexual assault was greater than
either the growth of the inmate or staff population. Id. at 19.
134. Id. The percentage of allegations involving female staff members and male
inmates was 53%, while the percentage of allegations involving male staff members and
female inmates was only 47%. Id.
135. Id.
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Between 2001 and 2008, there were eighty-six accusations of
abusive sexual contact, a category of sexually abusive behavior, by
male staff against female inmates, and seventy accusations of abu
sive sexual contact by female staff against male inmates.136 Bureau
of Prison (BOP) officials “believe[ ] that male staff members were
most often accused of sexual misconduct stemming from pat
searches.”137
If the BOP’s belief is accurate, then correct reporting would
reveal a much higher number of incidents of cross-gender abusive
sexual contact, much of it a result of pat searches.138 Therefore,
cross-gender pat searches expose federal inmates to an increased
risk of criminal sexual assault, implicating the Eighth Amendment,
and threatening not only the health and safety of inmates but also
the security of prison facilities.139
II.

EMPLOYEES: WHAT’S

THE

BIG DEAL?140

Women have traditionally met resistance when attempting to
secure employment within prison facilities, especially those classi
fied as maximum security housing male inmates.141 While numbers
136. Id. at 26, 28. While men were subject to more total allegations of abusive
cross-gender sexual contact, female employees were subject to allegations at a much
higher rate than their representation in the BOP workforce. Id. at 28. The percentage
of female staff members was only 26.5%, yet they accounted for 45% of the total allega
tions of abusive cross-gender sexual contact. Id. This discrepancy appears again in sta
tistics including all variations of sexual abuse. “Approximately 6 percent of all female
staff members were the subjects of allegations . . . predominantly of cross-gender of
fenses . . . .” Id. at 28-29. Only four percent of male staff was accused of sexual abuse.
Id. at 29.
137. Id. at 26. Because pat searches involve touching, these incidences should be
properly classified in the criminal category of abusive sexual contact rather than the
non-criminal category of sexual misconduct. Id. Sexual misconduct only includes non
physical incidents such as obscene gestures. See supra note 136. “[T]he high number of
abusive sexual contact allegations provides some support for the BOP’s perception.”
STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 118, at 26.
138. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
140. This portion of the Note largely will focus on the difficulties of women
seeking employment, rather than men. This is because, traditionally, men have not had
the same difficulties as women in finding corrections employment. See supra notes 50,
130-131 and accompanying text.
141. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 337 (1977) (upholding the use of
gender-based bona fide occupational qualification prohibiting women from working in
contact positions in a male maximum security prison); SUSAN EHRLICH MARTIN &
NANCY C. JURIK, DOING JUSTICE, DOING GENDER: WOMEN IN LAW AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE OCCUPATIONS 164 (1996) (“Researchers have anticipated that the greatest re
sistance to women [corrections officers] would occur in maximum security prisons.”).
On July 31, 2009 the Federal Bureau of Prisons reported that only 17.57% of the staff in
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of women working in corrections have grown since the late 1970’s,
they still represent a relatively small percentage of corrections staff
as compared to their presence in the total workforce.142 In order to
understand the importance of protecting female jobs within male
prisons, it is essential to understand the history of women in correc
tions, the effect that Title VII has had on their employment, and
their current presence in prisons today.
A. Women in Corrections Before Title VII
In the United States, women worked in corrections as early as
1793, when Mary Weed became known for her humane treatment
of both male and female inmates at the Walnut Street Jail.143 Wo
men like Ms. Weed were a rarity prior to 1861, when more women
began to enter correctional work.144
The first significant movement of women into corrections oc
curred between 1860 and 1900.145 Small groups of women reform
ers entered prisons in order to improve conditions for female
inmates, whom they felt were “morally superior to men.”146 The
reformers demanded separate prisons for women, which would be
run by women and would offer “homelike atmospheres of
rehabilitation.”147
Prior to this effort, women had been housed in joint facilities
with male prisoners.148 The creation of women’s prisons in the
1900s led to work opportunities for women corrections staff in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.149 Women became
its male high security prisons were female. Compare this number with 23.6% female at
medium security prisons, 25.06% at low security prisons, and 34.16% at minimum se
curity prisons. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, STAFF DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERIS
TICS—ALL STAFF (2009) (on file with author). Reports relating to each Federal Bureau
of Prisons institution were provided to the author on September 18, 2009 in response to
an August 26, 2009 Freedom of Information Act request. The reports were then com
piled in order to calculate these statistics.
142. MARTIN & JURIK, supra note 141, at 157.
143. Id. at 158.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. These religious reformers’ actions were based on a feeling of a “shared
[ ] common bond of innate, womanly spirit.” Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 158-59.
149. Id. at 159.
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administrators and jail matrons of both women’s and juvenile facili
ties by emphasizing stereotypical “womanly qualities.”150
Unfortunately, prison success was often due to adopting the
“warehouse-like character of men’s prisons.”151 As women’s pris
ons began to more closely resemble men’s prisons, they were in
creasingly run by men.152 Meanwhile, in the 1930s and 1940s,
women were allowed to volunteer as clerical staff in male prisons,
but were given no opportunity to supervise the inmates.153
B. Civil Rights Movements and the Implementation of Title VII
“The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) was enacted to eradi
cate employment discrimination and compensate victims of discrim
ination.”154 Through Title VII, Congress intended to “‘remov[e]
. . . artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of
racial or other impermissible classification[s].’”155 Title VII meant
that men could work in women’s prisons and that women could
work in men’s prisons, although opportunities were still limited.156
The first Title VII employment challenge relating to prison
cross-gender supervision to reach the Supreme Court occurred
more than ten years after the enactment of Title VII.157 In Dothard
v. Rawlinson, Ms. Rawlinson sought employment as a “correctional
counselor” with the Alabama Board of Corrections.158 Her appli
cation was rejected because she failed to meet a statutory weight
requirement of 120 lbs.159 Rawlinson filed a class action suit alleg
ing that she had been denied employment opportunities because of
her gender in contravention of Title VII.160
While the case was pending, the Alabama Board of Correc
tions adopted a Regulation requiring that corrections officers in
150. Id. Valued womanly characteristics included “inherently emotional and
sympathetic natures.” Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 159-60.
154. Smith, supra note 8, at 268; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
155. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328 (1977) (quoting Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
156. Jurado, supra note 23, at 23.
157. Smith, supra note 8, at 269.
158. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 323.
159. Id. The statute also required a minimum height of 5’2”. Id. at 323-24.
160. Id. at 324. Ms. Rawlinson also claimed that the use of height and weight
requirements was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend
ment. Id.
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“contact positions” with inmates at maximum security penitentia
ries be the same gender as the inmate.161 The new regulation made
it so that women could only compete for approximately 25% of the
corrections officers’ jobs available within the Alabama prison sys
tem.162 Rawlinson amended her complaint to include challenges to
this new regulation as violating both Title VII and Equal
Protection.163
The Court found that the height and weight requirements dis
qualified “41.13% of the female population.”164 The same restric
tions would “exclud[e] less than 1% of the male population.”165
Based on these statistics, the Court found that Rawlinson had suffi
ciently demonstrated that the requirements, while facially neutral,
had a disproportionate discriminatory effect.166
The burden shifted to Alabama to show that the height and
weight “‘requirement[s] [had] a manifest relationship to the em
ployment’” as a correctional officer.167 Alabama claimed that the
weight and height requirements bear “a relationship to strength, a
sufficient but unspecified amount of which is essential to effective
job performance.”168 The Court was unconvinced, stating that if
strength is a bona fide job-related quality, then Alabama should
adopt a test which measures strength.169 As a result of its failure to
show manifest relationship between weight and height and job per
formance in the face of disproportionate discriminatory effect, Ala
bama had violated Title VII.170
The Court then turned to the gender-based regulation to deter
mine whether it violated Title VII.171 Unlike the height and weight
requirements, the new regulation facially discriminated against ap
plicants based on gender.172 Alabama claimed that the regulation
was a bona-fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).173 A BFOQ
161. Id. at 324-25.
162. Id. at 327-28.
163. Id. at 325-26.
164. Id. at 329-30.
165. Id. at 330.
166. Id. at 329, 331.
167. Id. at 329.
168. Id. at 331.
169. Id. at 332. A strength measuring test would not violate Title VII because it
would “‘measure[ ] the person for the job and not the person in the abstract.’” Id.
(quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971)).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 333.
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permits gender-based discrimination where that qualification is
“reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise.”174 The BFOQ exception is “only the nar
rowest of exceptions to the general rule requiring equality of em
ployment opportunities.”175 BFOQ’s are not allowed to be used by
employers “to refuse to hire an individual woman or man on the
basis of stereotyped characterizations of the sexes.”176 Therefore,
generally “the argument that a particular job is too dangerous for
women” would not create a BFOQ.177 In this case, however, the
Court upheld the use of a gender-based BFOQ.178
The Court found that the circumstances of the Alabama maxi
mum security penitentiaries were unique.179 The prisons had al
ready been found unconstitutionally dangerous.180 Furthermore,
twenty percent of the male prisoners were sex offenders.181 The sex
offenders were scattered throughout the various prison dormito
ries.182 Because of the level of danger involved, in conjunction with
the number of sex offenders, the Court held that “[t]he likelihood
that inmates would assault a woman because she was a woman
would pose a real threat not only to the victim of the assault but
also to the” security of the penitentiary as a whole.183 As a result
“[t]he employee’s very womanhood would . . . directly undermine
her capacity to provide the security that is the essence of a correc
tional counselor’s responsibility.”184
Despite the negative outcome of Dothard, women were able to
make their way into corrections positions.185 Generally, courts
174. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006)).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 335. “[T]he purpose of Title VII [is] to allow the individual woman to
make that choice for herself.” Id.
178. Id. at 336-37.
179. Id. at 334.
180. Id. (“[A] Federal District Court has held that the conditions of confinement
in the prisons of the State, characterized by ‘rampant violence’ and a ‘jungle atmos
phere’ are constitutionally intolerable.” (quoting Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 325
(M.D. Ala. 1976))).
181. Id. at 335.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 336. Because the essence of a correction officer’s job is to maintain
security, a threat to security of the institution as a whole based on gender can create a
BFOQ. Id. at 335. The reasoning behind the BFOQ is not paternalistic protection of
women, but rather that there is “[m]ore . . . at stake in this case . . . than an individual
woman’s decision to weigh and accept the risks of employment.” Id.
184. Id. at 336.
185. Jurado, supra note 23, at 27.
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failed to find the same unique set of circumstances that made the
Alabama prisons so dangerous and therefore justified a BFOQ.186
C. Women Working in Prisons Now
Legal problems, however, are not the only issue faced by wo
men attempting to find employment in male prisons. Even now,
women continue to battle issues including paternalism, sexual har
assment, and gender stereotypes regarding their ability to do a
classically masculine job.187 There is also a perception that male
inmates will be resistant to female officers.188 Studies have shown,
however, that staff resistance to women corrections officers is
greater than inmate resistance;189 inmates are generally receptive to
women.190 These lingering issues may explain why women continue
to be under utilized in the field of corrections, comprising only
about 26% of the workforce for the Federal Bureau of Prisons
(BOP).191
186. Id.
187. See MARTIN & JURIK, supra note 141, at 168-79 (stating that traditional conceptions of female incompetence, including perceptions of women as “little sisters” who
accept male protection or “seductresses,” reinforces the feeling of “working-class mas
culinity,” which may be threatened by strong, competent, female correctional officers);
Richard H. Rison, Women as High-Security Officers: Gender-Neutral Employment in
High-Security Prisons, 3 FED. PRISONS J. 19, 20 (1994) (discussing “myths about women
in the workplace” including that they do not want to be promoted, that advancement is
precluded by family life, and that women do not have the necessary skills for
advancement).
188. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS,
WOMEN AS CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS IN MEN’S MAXIMUM SECURITY FACILITIES: A
SURVEY OF THE FIFTY STATES 3 (1991), available at www.nicic.org/pubs/1991/
009504.pdf.
189. Id. at 3 (noting that staff resistance from male corrections officers often
came from a perception “that women need protection and wouldn’t perform well in
emergencies”). During the survey, Kentucky noted that their “paranoia” regarding as
saults on female staff turned out to be groundless. Id. at 14.
The State of Connecticut recently settled a case involving fourteen female correc
tions officers for $2.5 million; the women alleged that “they were subject to sexually
demeaning remarks by mail [sic] prison guards and even recruited as prostitutes.”
Thomas B. Scheffey, Female Prison Guards Settle for $2.5 Million, CONN. L. TRIB., Jan.
11, 2010, at 14. Sexually demeaning comments made in front of inmates placed female
guards “at risk of attack.” Id. Male guards would also interrupt walk-talkie transmis
sions from female guards, thereby “making it difficult or impossible to call for help or
extricate themselves from dangerous situations.” Id.
190. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 188, at 3; MARTIN & JURIK, supra
note 141, at 168-179. Inmates may be resistant either for privacy concerns or because
they are hesitant to take orders from a woman. Id.
191. Women comprised approximately 46.3% of the total work force in 1998 and
were projected to comprise 48% by 2015. Howard N. Fullerton, Jr., Labor Force Par
ticipation: 75 Years of Change, 1950-98 and 1998-2025, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1, 10 (Dec.

R

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE211.txt

594

unknown

Seq: 28

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

27-SEP-11

10:25

[Vol. 33:567

This underutilization comes despite recognition that women
have a positive impact on conditions within prisons. Prisons have
reported that female corrections officers may have a calming influ
ence on male inmates.192 Furthermore, female staff tend to have a
normalizing effect, better preparing inmates to face the outside
world.193 Some states noted an improved ability to staff prisons be
cause of a greater pool of applicants.194 Finally, unusual benefits
such as “fewer grievances . . . , [that] women’s presence has made
male officers more attentive to assignments . . . , and [that] women
are more observant and attentive than male officers,” were
noted.195 Interestingly, several systems noted that women bring a
new, less confrontational, perspective to problem-solving.196
Currently, there are 8,623 women working for the Federal
BOP.197 Of those, 6,385 (74%) work in entirely male prisons, com
prising 24.4% of the workforce.198 Another 1,497 female staff work
1999) available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1999/12/art1full.pdf. Even the 26% fe
male workforce is a vast improvement for the BOP, however. In 1988, twenty-four
years after Title VII was enacted, only 7% of the BOP’s workforce were women. MAR
TIN & JURIK, supra note 141, at 164.
192. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 188, at 4. The following states
referenced the calming effect of women on male inmates: Alaska (“not[ing] that in
mates control their behavior and maintain better hygiene when women are present”),
Colorado (noting that the presence of women “tends to defuse a critical incident rather
than escalate one”), Hawaii (noting that women have an “ability to diffuse tensions and
tone down the harshness and violence of the facility environment”), Idaho (noting that
“inmates are said to be calmer and to deal with women staff on a different level than
they do men”), Illinois (noting that female presence “improves male inmates’ tempera
ment and mannerisms” leading to a reduction of “‘macho’ behavior”), Indiana, Kansas
(noting that inmates are now “easier to handle and better behaved”), Minnesota, Mon
tana (referring to “their calming effect on inmates” as the “main benefit” of women
corrections officers), Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma (citing women’s
ability “to keep [a] lid on hostile situations”), Oregon (acknowledging both the calming
effect, and an improvement in inmates’ personal appearances), Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Tennessee (noting that women “are given more respect and inmates are quieter
and better-behaved around them”), Washington (noting “reduced levels of violence,
less need for confrontation to enforce rules, cleaner cell blocks, [and] inmates’ hygiene
improved”), and Wyoming. Id. at 6-34.
193. Id. at 4.
194. Id.
195. Id. Idaho, in particular, noted that the number of grievances had dropped
from between seventy to eighty per month to a high of about fifteen. Id. at 10.
196. Id. at 16. Illinois noted that inmates benefit from observing women use
“their brains rather than brawn” during conflict resolution. Id. at 11. Similarly Ken
tucky noted that women have taught both inmates and male staff better, healthier con
flict resolution skills. Id. at 14.
197. See infra Tables 2, 3 & 4.
198. See infra Table 4.
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in mixed gender facilities.199 Only 8.5% (741) of the women work
ing for the BOP work in an entirely female institution.200 This
makes sense given that women comprise 26% of the workforce but
only 7% of the inmate population.201 While there are 108 male and
mixed gender institutions in the BOP, there are only seven female
institutions.202
Men also work in cross-gender supervisory positions. Cur
rently there are 958 men working in the BOP’s seven entirely fe
male facilities.203 Within those facilities, men comprise approxi
mately 56% of the workforce.204 FCI Waseca has the highest per
centage of male staffing at approximately 70%, while FCI Alderson
has the lowest at approximately 41%.205
III.

COMPARING RIGHTS: DOES ONE SET TAKE PRECEDENCE?

This section of the Note examines the conflict between inmate
rights implicated by cross-gender pat searches and employment
rights in light of both preexisting case law and current empirical
evidence. Ultimately, the conclusion is reached that inmates’ con
stitutional rights take precedence over the employment rights of
corrections staff, and therefore the use of non-emergency cross-gen
der pat searches should be abolished.206
199. See infra Table 3.
200. See infra Table 2.
201. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, STATE OF
THE BUREAU 2007 BUREAU OF PRISONS STAFF: EVERYDAY HEROES 52 (2007). The
statistic for the percentage of female inmates is as of 2007. Id.
202. See infra Tables 2, 3 & 4.
203. See infra Table 2.
204. See infra Table 2.
205. See infra Table 2.
206. While this Note focuses on the legal rights of both inmates and employees,
as well as the responsibilities of the various correctional institutions, it is important to
recognize that there is a financial aspect to this debate. Based on a study of the cost
impact of the PREA Commission standards, the “Limits to Cross-Gender Viewing and
Searches” standard is expected to have the highest on-going cost impact. See BOOZ
ALLEN HAMILTON, supra note 118, at 14. “The underlying cause of this impact is attributed solely to the prohibition of cross-gender pat down searches within the standard.”
Id. This standard also had one of the lowest levels of pre-existing compliance. Id. One
“environmental driver” supporting cross-gender pat searches is cited as “local or state
laws that mandate equal opportunity employment, which create a barrier to removing
cross-gender pat down searches.” Id. at 15. Overall, compliance with the standard is
estimated at over $21 million in upfront costs and around $90 million in on-going costs
annually. Id. at 11.
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A. Men Working in Women’s Prisons
The case for ending cross-gender pat searches is more compel
ling for female inmates.207 The reasons behind this discrepancy are
two-fold. First, society has been more willing to recognize and re
spect female inmates’ constitutional rights;208 second, the threat of
employment discrimination against men in corrections is not per
ceived as being as dire because men do not have an established
history of employment discrimination.209
When women have challenged cross-gender pat searches under
the Fourth and Eighth Amendments their rights have been up
held.210 One reason to uphold a female inmates’ challenge, as
opposed to a male’s, is that women are recognized as “‘experi
ence[ing] unwanted intimate touching by men differently from men
subject to comparable touching by women.’”211 The Eighth
Amendment provides a further advantage for inmates seeking to
challenge cross-gender pat searches because it is uninhibited by the
Turner test’s reasonableness standard.212
Jordan v. Gardner is one example where female inmates suc
ceeded in challenging cross-gender pat searches.213 Jordan can be
interpreted as an anomaly in light of the uniquely compelling cir
cumstances presented by that case (84% of the inmates had histo
ries of sexual assault).214 Current nationwide statistics for female
prisoners with a history of sexual assault are similarly compelling.
207. Schlanger, supra note 15, at 5 (stating that because of the greater impact on
female job employment, the lesser extent of histories of sexual assault, and lower fre
quencies of sexual victimization by correctional staff, “a prohibition on non-emergency
pat-downs . . . is less urgent for male prisoners”).
208. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1534 (9th Cir. 1993); Colman v. Vas
quez, 142 F. Supp. 2d 226, 232 (D. Conn. 2001) (holding that female inmates’ privacy
rights are “qualitatively different” than men’s privacy rights).
209. See Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 962 (7th Cir. 1983).
210. See Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1522-23; Colman, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 230, 235 (D.
Conn. 2001). Men making similar claims are often not successful. See Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52, 53 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that cross-gender pat searches “clearly
fall[ ] short of the kind of shocking, barbarious [sic] treatment proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment,” and further concluding that they do not violate the Fourth Amendment
either); supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
211. Colman, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 232 (quoting Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1526). This
Note does not directly address whether the assertion that women experience unwanted
touching from the opposite gender differently than men is valid. For a discussion on the
interaction between gender stereotypes and the challenges to cross-gender supervision
see Jurado, supra note 23, at 39-53; Smith, supra note 8, at 276-83.
212. See supra notes 31, 82-83 and accompanying text.
213. Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1525.
214. Id.
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In 1999, 39% of female state prison inmates reported sexual abuse
prior to incarceration.215 Inmates who are sexually victimized while
incarcerated would, presumably, increase the percentage of women
incarcerated who have suffered sexual victimization above 39%. In
a survey conducted for the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA)
Commission, 5% of women reported being sexually assaulted
within the previous twelve months (compared with 3% of men).216
These statistics show that over a third of female state inmates sub
jected to cross-gender pat searches could face the feelings of revictimization that the Ninth Circuit in Jordan held constituted cruel
and unusual punishment.217
While Fourth and Eighth Amendment challenges result from
the act of the cross-gender pat search in and of itself, there is also a
concern that cross-gender pat searches expose female inmates to
greater instances of sexual assault. This concern was addressed by
the PREA Commission’s standard prohibiting cross-gender pat
searches.218 The PREA Commission found that “searches carried
out by staff of the opposite gender heighten the potential for
abuse.”219
The PREA Commission’s findings were corroborated by the
findings of the Department of Justice in its study of staff sexual
abuse.220 “BOP officials believe[ ] that male staff . . . were most
often accused of sexual misconduct [relating to] pat searches.”221
Furthermore, cross-gender pat searches heighten the risk for sexual
assault beyond solely abusive sexual contact or sexual misconduct.
In Colman v. Vasquez, a cross-gender pat search started with abu
sive sexual contact, and escalated, over the course of months, to
rape.222 Between 2001 and 2008, there were 234 allegations of ei
ther sexual abuse or aggravated sexual abuse against male staff to
wards female inmates.223 It is impossible to determine how many of
these may have been initiated with a cross-gender pat search.
215. HARLOW, supra note 85, at 1. Only 5.8% of male state prison inmates made
the same claim. Id.
216. PREA REPORT, supra note 10, at 41.
217. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
218. PREA REPORT, supra note 10, at 62.
219. Id.
220. See supra notes 132-137 and accompanying text.
221. STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 118, at 26.
222. Colman v. Vasequez, 142 F. Supp. 2d 226, 226 (D. Conn. 2001) (involving an
inmate subjected to several months of sexual harassment that had started with a crossgender pat search where the officer made inappropriate advances and “culminat[ed] in
a physical assault”).
223. STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 118, at 26.
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There are also indications of strong societal movement toward
the prohibition of cross-gender pat searches in female institu
tions.224 Twenty-five states have voluntarily limited cross-gender
pat searches of female inmates to emergency circumstances only.225
An additional three states (and Washington, D.C.) completely pro
hibit cross-gender pat searches on females.226 Of the remaining
states, only eleven (and the Federal Bureau of Prisons) generally
allow cross-gender pat searches.227 This trend is not only indicative
of societal views on women and cross-gender pat searches, but on
the feasibility of limiting these dangerous pat searches in women’s
prisons. This showing of feasibility strengthens other cross-gender
pat search challenges. In Forde v. Zickefoose, a federal district
court questioned whether cross-gender pat searches were the least
restrictive means to fulfill security and employment concerns given
the prevalence of states that do not use them.228
Balanced against the female inmate’s rights enumerated above,
is a male corrections officer’s right to be free from employment dis
crimination. Male corrections officers do not have the same history
of discrimination in employment that women do; therefore, the le
gitimate penological interest of equalizing job opportunities is not
as compelling.229 Current employment statistics support that men
224. While this Note addresses this issue by focusing on societal movements and
changes in the law within the United States, a compelling argument can be made on the
basis of international law. The United Nation’s Standard Minimum Rules for the Treat
ment of Prisoners suggest a complete ban of cross-gender supervision for female in
mates. UNITED NATIONS, STANDARD MINIMUM RULES FOR THE TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS Rule 53(3), at 8 (1977), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/
treatmentprisoners.pdf (“Women prisoners shall be attended and supervised only by
women officers.”); see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, “NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE”: VIO
LATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, http://www.amnestyusa.org/
document.php?id=D0F5C2222D1AABEA8025690000692FC4&lang=e (last visited Jan.
23, 2011).
225. See infra Table 1.
226. See infra Table 1; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUS
TODY: SEXUAL MISCONDUCT AND SHACKLING OF PREGNANT WOMEN, POLICIES, PRO
CEDURES AND PRACTICES OF GUARDING WOMEN, http://www.amnestyusa.org/violence
against - women / abuse - of - women - in - custody / key - findings - policies - procedures - and
practices-of-guarding-women/page.do?id=1108299 (last visited Jan. 23, 2011) [hereinaf
ter ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY].
227. See infra Table 1; ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 226.
228. Forde v. Zickefoose, 612 F. Supp. 2d 171, 178 (D. Conn. 2009). Using this
same reasoning, a male inmate’s claim is not as strong because states have not similarly
chosen to forego cross-gender pat searches in male prisons.
229. Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 962 (7th Cir. 1983); see Tharp v. Iowa
Dep’t of Corr., 68 F.3d 223, 226 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that the court will uphold “a . . .
reasonable gender-based job assignment policy, particularly a policy that is favorable to
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do not have difficulty securing employment in corrections. As of
July 2009, there were 24,766 men working with the Federal BOP,
and of those, only 958 men (3%) worked at a facility housing solely
female inmates.230 As a result, even if all positions involving crossgender pat searches were abolished through a BFOQ, only a very
small percentage of men in corrections would be affected.
Women have strong claims against cross-gender pat searches
under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. A ban on cross-gender
pat searches in female facilities reflects a societal movement to
wards respecting a woman’s right to privacy, as seen by the number
of states who voluntarily prohibit the practice.231 The very fact that
so many states choose not to use cross-gender pat searches supports
the viability of prohibiting them. A prohibition on non-emergency
cross-gender pat searches is in line with the stated goals of the
Prison Rape Elimination Act, which is to reduce incidents of sexual
assault to zero.232 When the numerous, drastic implications of
cross-gender pat searches are weighed against the relatively mini
mal potential effect on employment for male correctional staff, the
better conclusion is that the only conclusion that can be reached is
that cross-gender pat searches of female inmates should be
prohibited.
B. Women Working in Men’s Prisons
When looking at prior legal precedent, male inmates do not
have as persuasive an argument as their female counterparts. Un
like women, men have rarely succeeded in challenging cross-gender
pat searches under either the Fourth or Eighth Amendments.233
Courts claim that most male inmates do not object to cross-gender
pat searches in order to undermine the privacy claims of those who
the protected class of women employees,” so long as the restrictions on other, presuma
bly male, employees is minimal).
230. See infra Table 2, 3, & 4.
231. See infra Table 1.
232. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
233. See Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1093 (8th Cir. 1990); Smith v. Fairman,
678 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1982); Bagley v. Watson, 579 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Or. 1983). While a
male inmate’s privacy rights were respected in Sterling v. Cupp, that case involved espe
cially invasive pat searches, which involved anal and genital contact. Sterling v. Cupp,
625 P.2d 123, 131-32 (Or. 1981). The holding in Sterling was quickly undermined by
Bagley v. Watson, which held that women’s Title VII rights take precedence over the
inmates’ state constitutional rights because of the supremacy clause. Bagley, 579 F.
Supp. at 1105.
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do.234 In Smith v. Fairman, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that
pat searches can “be . . . humiliating and degrading,” and crossgender pat searches only more so, but it still held that the humilia
tion involved falls short of violating the Eighth Amendment.235
The court in Timm v. Gunter, justified upholding cross-gender pat
searches by citing the fact that women are trained to perform pat
searches “professionally.”236 In so holding, the Eighth Circuit
failed to acknowledge that often potential constitutional violations
arise from the gender of the corrections officer itself, irrespective of
whether the pat search is performed “professionally.”
Statistics show, however, that cross-gender pat searches are
often not performed professionally.237 There is a higher prevalence
of allegations of abusive cross-gender sexual contact from female
staff than their male counterparts.238 The purpose of the Prison
Rape Elimination Act is to “protect incarcerated individuals from
sexual abuse.”239 “In order to detect, prevent, reduce, and punish
prison rape, and to protect inmates’ constitutional rights, the legal
system must acknowledge that female staff can and do perpetrate
sexual misconduct in prisons.”240 Furthermore, protecting male in
mates from sexual assault is imperative, given the negative and
long-lasting effects of staff sexual assault on not only the inmate,
but on society as a whole.241 This rationale led the PREA Commis
234. Timm, 917 F.2d at 1100 (“The District Court found that at [Nebraska State
Penitentiary] most inmates do not reject opposite-sex pat searches with ‘great fre
quency.’”); Bagley, 579 F. Supp. at 1104 (“The facts presented to this court show . . .
that only a minority of male inmates suffer an invasion of their perceived personal
privacy interests by the presence of female guards.”).
235. Smith, 678 F.2d at 53.
236. Timm, 917 F.2d at 1100.
237. See supra notes 133-138. See generally Lauren A. Teichner, Unusual Suspects: Recognizing and Responding to Female Staff Perpetrators of Sexual Misconduct
in U.S. Prisons, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 259, 288-94 (2008) (arguing that gender
stereotypes portraying men as the sexual aggressors and women as passive participants
have allowed women to “become ‘nearly invisible as sexual criminal[s]’ to the criminal
justice system” (quoting Kay L. Levine, No Penis, No Problem, 33 FORDHAM URB. L. J.
357, 384 (2006) (alterations in original))).
238. See supra notes 134-135 and accompanying text.
239. See STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 118, at 1.
240. Teichner, supra note 237, at 297.
241. See PREA REPORT, supra note 10, at 44-48.
[F]ailure by lawmakers and the courts to adequately respond to staff sexual
misconduct will have severe consequences for inmates and the prison system
in general. Allowing staff sexual misconduct to persist behind prison walls
can, for instance, jeopardize prison security, create an environment lacking in
“mutual respect” between staff and inmates, endanger the public health, and
violate inmates’ constitutional rights.
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sion to call for the cessation of cross-gender pat searches in nonemergency situations for both male and female inmates.242
Balanced against male inmates’ rights are the Title VII em
ployment rights of female officers, analyzed in light of the history of
discrimination found in the field of corrections. “Reduction of the
disparity in economic condition between men and women caused
by the long history of discrimination against women has been recog
nized as . . . an important governmental objective.”243
Not only does the history of discrimination substantiate the
need to allow women to work in male prisons, there is also the very
real effect that a gender-based BFOQ would have on female cor
rections officers throughout the country. Unlike men, of whom
only a very small percentage work in an all female institution, 74%
of women employed as corrections officers by the Federal Bureau
of Prisons (BOP) work in institutions entirely populated by male
inmates.244 In a worst-case scenario, if no women are permitted to
work in men’s prisons, 6,385 women would lose their jobs in the
BOP alone.245
Despite the potential employment consequences, a male in
mates’ right to be free from sexual assault should take precedence
over employment rights. Congress recognized the importance of
preventing sexual assault through implementation of a zero-toler
ance policy in the Prison Rape Elimination Act.246 Being sexually
assaulted “is simply ‘not part of the penalty that criminal offenders
pay for their offenses against society.’”247 Because cross-gender
pat searches increase the likelihood of sexual assault, their use is
inherently inconsistent with a zero-tolerance policy. Therefore,
cross-gender pat searches should not be performed on male inmates
in a non-emergency situation.
IV. SOLUTIONS
The conclusion has been reached that both male and female
inmates’ rights should take precedence; therefore, there should be a
Teichner, supra note 237, at 297-98 (citations omitted).
242. Id. at 62-63.
243. Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 962 (7th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (citations
omitted) (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977)).
244. See infra Tables 2, 3 & 4.
245. See infra Table 3.
246. 42 U.S.C. § 15602 (2006).
247. PREA REPORT, supra note 10, at 35 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825
(1994)).
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nationwide prohibition on cross-gender pat searches. This conclu
sion does not necessarily mean that employment rights should be
disregarded. The right of women to be free from employment dis
crimination, allowing them to work in male prisons, has resulted
from decades of continual effort.248 This effort has been directed
not only towards overcoming legal hurdles, but also towards over
coming gender-based stereotypes held by prisoners, co-workers,
and supervisors.249 Employing women in male prisons benefits in
mates as well as male co-workers.250 Women have been credited
with having calming and normalizing effects on prisoners, encour
aging practices such as non-confrontational problem solving, and
causing an increase in overall diligence.251 Furthermore, an elimi
nation of women in men’s prisons would lead to unemployment for
approximately 7,000 women in the Federal Bureau of Prisons
alone.252
This Part looks at solutions found in the case law, analyzing
whether the solution is appropriate in light of inmate and employee
rights. Initially, this section examines, and dismisses, the use of
BFOQs to protect inmates’ rights from cross-gender pat searches.
Then, this Note looks at the idea of compromise to accommodate
both sets of rights, and in particular at a variety of practical solu
tions that could be implemented to protect both inmates and cor
rections officers’ rights. No one solution will fully address the
problem in every institution. So long as potential solutions exist
respecting both sets of rights prison administrators must attempt to
implement corrective policies before subjugating employment
rights to inmate privacy rights.
A. The Bona-Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ)
Bona-fide occupational qualifications (BFOQs) are an excep
tion to Title VII’s prohibition on discriminatory hiring practices.253
BFOQs allow an employer to discriminate based on gender where
gender is integral to job performance.254 BFOQs are meant to be
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

See supra notes 141-153 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 187-190 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 190-196and accompanying text.
See supra notes 188, 192-196 and accompanying text.
See infra Tables 3 & 4.
See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
Everson v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 391 F.3d 737, 747-48 (6th Cir. 2004).
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an extremely narrow exception, providing relief from Title VII in
only the most compelling circumstances.255
In order to ensure narrow interpretations for BFOQs, courts
have created several formulations. One formulation states that “an
employer could rely on the BFOQ exception only by proving ‘that
he had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believ
ing, that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform
safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved.’”256
To create a BFOQ, an employer must first show that it is rea
sonably necessary to the operation of the business, rather than
“merely reasonable or convenient.”257 To meet this standard, sub
stantially all, if not all, members of the discriminated gender would
need to be unable to perform the job so that making the determina
tion on an individual basis would be either “impossible or highly
impractical.”258 Furthermore, the determination that members of
one sex would be unable to perform the job must have a factual
basis; an employer may not rely on stereotypical differences or
myths.259 A real difference between the sexes is one not based on
“culturally induced proclivities.”260 To that end, an employer must
ask “whether . . . the very womanhood or very manhood of the
employee undermines his or her capacity to perform a job
satisfactorily.”261
“[I]n order to qualify as a BFOQ, a job qualification must re
late to the essence, or to the central mission of the employer’s busi
255. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333, 334 (1977); Everson, 391 F.3d at
748; Torres v. Wisc. Dep’t of Health & Social Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1527 (7th Cir. 1988).
Compelling circumstances are necessary to justify a BFOQ because
employment discrimination . . . is “one of the most deplorable forms of dis
crimination known to our society, for it deals with not just an individual’s shar
ing in the ‘outer benefits’ of being an American citizen, but rather the ability
to provide decently for one’s family in a job or profession for which he quali
fies or chooses.”
Id. at 1526-27 (quoting Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1982)).
256. Torres, 859 F.2d at 1527 (quoting Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d
385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971)). Another formulation states that “discrimination based on sex
is valid only when the essence of the business operation would be undermined” by not
hiring members of one sex exclusively. Id. (emphasis added).
257. Everson, 391 F.3d at 748.
258. Id.
259. Torres, 859 F.2d at 1527. The Torres court noted, however, that “there are
real as well as fictional differences between men and women.” Id. (citing City of Los
Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (9th Cir. 1978)).
260. Id. at 1528 (quoting Torres v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
639 F. Supp. 271, 278 (E.D. Wis. 1986)).
261. Id.
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ness.”262 Furthermore, prisons must be examined individually to
determine the necessities of the specific environment.263 Finally,
the employer carries the heavy burden of establishing that there
were no reasonable alternatives to the creation of a BFOQ.264
Even where courts have been willing to recognize an inmate’s
right to privacy, they have been hesitant to create a BFOQ. In
Forts v. Ward, the Second Circuit suggested that prisoner privacy
rights may be sufficient to overcome the guards’ interest in equal
job opportunities, but still refused to recognize a gender-based
BFOQ for positions in female inmates’ sleeping chambers.265 The
Second Circuit instead placed the onus on inmates to protect their
own privacy by wearing one-piece pajamas (referred to by the dis
trict court as “a two-legged bag”) which could be “uncomfortably
warm.”266
An exception has occurred where prison administrators have
voluntarily instituted a BFOQ based on a reasonable determination
that it is necessary to protect prisoner rights.267 Courts give deci
sions of prison administrators deference, which allows them to deal
with the myriad problems facing them on a daily basis.268 When the
262. Everson, 391 F.3d at 749.
263. Torres, 859 F.2d at 1529.
264. Everson, 391 F.3d at 737, 749.
265. Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1217 (2d Cir. 1980). The court stated that they
did “not minimize in any way the significance of the privacy interests of the inmates
. . . . We do not elevate the employment rights of the guards above any protectible [sic]
privacy rights of the inmates.” Id.
266. Id. “We seriously doubt that the inmates’ interests in style or even in avoid
ing the occasional discomfort of warmth from a sleeping garment are of sufficient grav
ity to justify denial of equal employment opportunities.” Id.
267. See Torres, 859 F.2d at 1532-33 (upholding BFOQ created to promote “in
mate rehabilitation and security”); Everson, 391 F.3d at 748-49 (holding that the em
ployer in this case had established the BFOQ defense as well as listing the requirements
that must be met in order to establish such a defense). In Everson the Sixth Circuit
upheld the creation of a BFOQ that had been implemented in response to several law
suits resulting from sexual assault of inmates. Id. at 751, 759.
268. See Everson, 391 F.3d at 750 (“Because of the unusual responsibilities en
trusted to them, the redoubtable challenges they face, and the unique resources they
possess, the decisions of prison administrators are entitled to a degree of deference,
even in the Title VII context.”); Torres, 859 F.2d at 1529 (recognizing that “[u]nless
prison administrators try new approaches, the ‘intractable problems’ will remain and
the lot of the incarcerated individual will not improve”). The Sixth Circuit in Everson
held that a substantial degree of deference is allowed where the decision is “the product
of a reasoned decision making process, based on available information and experience.”
Everson, 391 F.3d at 750 (quoting Torres, 859 F.2d at 1532) (internal quotation marks
omitted). It justified this deference because prison administrators “must grapple with
the ‘perplexing sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal
function in the criminal justice system: to punish justly, to deter future crime and to
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BFOQ is supported by administrators it may be upheld even where
the implicated prisoner rights do not rise to a constitutional level.269
In order to prevent cross-gender pat searches a prison adminis
trator may implement a gender-based BFOQ for all contact posi
tions within the prison.270 Prohibiting as many as 25% of
correctional staff in male prisons,271 and 56% in female prisons,272
from performing pat searches would arguably undermine safety and
security throughout. In Smith v. Fairman, the Seventh Circuit
stated that if a prison is going to be required to hire female officers,
it must be allowed to utilize them to the fullest extent.273 Imagina
bly, the converse is true as well, barring the ability to fully utilize
female officers, a prison should be allowed not to hire them.
Creating a gender-based BFOQ for contact positions involving
performance of cross-gender pat searches is legally justifiable under
the standard articulated in Dothard v. Rawlinson. Dothard re
quires that the very womanhood (or manhood) of the officer under
mine his or her ability to do the job.274 Many of the Constitutional
claims arise from the incidence of the cross-gender pat search itself;
they bear no relation to the ability of the corrections officer to per
form the search professionally.275 Therefore, it is the very woman
hood (or manhood) which interferes with performance of the job.
return imprisoned persons to society with an improved chance of being useful law-abid
ing citizens.’” Id. (quoting Torres, 859 F.2d at 1529). In order to fulfill this role, a
prison administrator must be allowed to “innovate and experiment” with new ap
proaches. Id. (quoting Torres, 859 F.2d at 1529).
269. Everson, 391 F.3d at 759 (“Regardless of whether its current conditions vio
late the constitutional rights of its inmates, a prison may invoke the BFOQ defense to
justify measures taken to enhance inmate privacy.” (emphasis added)).
270. Opponents of prohibiting cross-gender pat searches urge that a BFOQ
would be necessary, thereby directly pitting employment rights against the inmates’
rights. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1529 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting prison’s
argument that cross-gender pat searches were necessary to avoid a discrimination-based
lawsuit by the union); Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 962-63 (7th Cir. 1983) (uphold
ing disparate treatment between male and female inmates based on legitimate peno
logical interest in providing employment opportunities for women); Forde v.
Zickefoose, 612 F. Supp. 2d 171, 178 (D. Conn. 2009) (stating that the court is sympa
thetic to the prison’s Title VII concerns).
271. See infra Table 4.
272. See infra Table 2.
273. Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52, 54 (7th Cir. 1982).
274. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1977).
275. For example, the inmates in Jordan v. Gardner were susceptible to feelings
of re-victimization solely because it was a man performing the pat search. See Jordan,
986 F.2d at 1525. The inmates’ feelings arose from their past experiences with men, not
from the corrections officers themselves. Id. at 1525-26. Similarly, in Forde v. Zick
efoose, it was the gender (the manhood) of the officer that offended Forde’s religious
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In women’s prisons, the creation of a BFOQ for contact posi
tions may not be feasible as a practical matter. In the Federal Bu
reau of Prisons, for instance, female officers comprise less than half
of the current staff in womens’ correctional institutions.276 There
fore, in the BOP, there is simply an insufficient number of female
staff available to cover all contact positions.277 Without a BFOQ,
female staff may be required to perform more pat searches, because
male staff will no longer be performing them. Staff disgruntlement,
however, is neither a basis for violating inmates’ constitutional
rights, nor is it a basis for employment discrimination.278
In men’s prisons, the creation of a BFOQ for all contact posi
tions, while potentially feasible, has a number of negative side ef
fects. Most clearly, there are approximately 7,000 women who
would likely lose their job in the Federal BOP alone.279 Inmates
and male staff would suffer as well because women have been
beliefs, not a stereotypical perception of a man’s ability to professionally perform a pat
search. See Forde, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 174.
The DOJ’s proposed standard on cross-gender supervision would require that
agencies train their staff to perform cross-gender pat searches professionally and re
spectfully. National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 76
Fed. Reg. 6,248, 6,253 (proposed Feb. 3, 2011) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt 115).
Unfortunately, this standard fails to address any of the circumstances under which a
cross-gender pat search can lead to a constitutional violation even where the search
itself is done in a professional manner.
276. See infra Table 2.
277. See infra Table 2 (showing that women comprise only 43.6% of the staff at
entirely female institutions). The argument may be made that it is in light of the rela
tively small number of female staff that cross-gender pat searches are necessary. This
argument is undermined, however, by the fact that so many states have already limited
cross-gender pat searches to emergencies. See infra Table 1.
278. Nor should staff disgruntlement entitle prison administrators to disregard
employment rights.
“Minor adjustments of staff schedules and job responsibilities do not consti
tute the type of administrative burden that justifies overriding constitutional
rights. . . . The adjustments pointed to by the prison officials [that barring male
guards from conducting suspicionless searches would require some adjust
ments of staff schedules and job responsibilities] are de minimis indeed.”
Forde v. Baird, 720 F. Supp. 2d 170, 181 (D. Conn. 2010) (quoting Jordan, 986 F.2d at
1539 (Reinhardt, J., concurring)); see infra notes 296-299 and accompanying text.
279. See infra Tables 3 & 4. During a study to determine the costs associated with
implementing the PREA Commission standards, the departments of correction in both
Indiana and Massachusetts claimed that ending cross-gender pat searches would force
them to lay off female staff. See BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, supra note 118, at 15. Indiana claimed it would need to eliminate 639 female officers at a one-time cost of
$14,985,000. Id. Massachusetts claimed it would need to eliminate 69 female officers at
a cost of $1,8974,000. Id. Based on the study it is unclear whether these positions
assume implementation of a BFOQ or whether they would be necessary given one of
the suggested solutions below.
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found to have a number of positive effects both for the inmates and
for their fellow co-workers.280 Since men already comprise greater
than 75% of the staff in the all male prisons within the BOP,281
exempting the remaining 25% from performance of pat searches
would not impose the same level of administrative difficulty seen in
female prisons. While the male staff may be required to perform
additional pat searches, because women would no longer be per
forming them, appeasing staff is not a justifiable basis for employ
ment discrimination.282
Furthermore, as argued below, the conflict is not one between
inmates’ rights and employment but rather is one between employ
ment rights and administrative convenience.283 If a prison can suc
cessfully implement an alternative solution, even an
administratively inconvenient one, it must. Employment rights may
not be subjugated to administrative convenience.284
Given the stringent guidelines necessary to qualify for the nar
row BFOQ exception to Title VII, the practical reasons against us
ing a BFOQ, and that other solutions are available, a BFOQ is not
the appropriate solution to end cross-gender pat searches.
B. The Role of Compromise in Weighing Inmate and Employee
Rights
While courts have recognized that inmates’ privacy rights and
correction officers’ employment rights can come into conflict,285
they often require a prison system to demonstrate an inability to
reconcile these rights before subjugating one to the other.286
280. See supra notes 192-196.
281. See infra Table 4.
282. See supra note 278.
283. See infra notes 296-297 and accompanying text.
284. See infra notes 296-297 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 4; Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52, 55 (7th Cir. 1982) (“While
recognizing the right of one sex not to be discriminated against in job opportunities
within the prison because of their gender, [other courts] have also concluded that in
mates do have some right to avoid unwanted intrusions by persons of the opposite
sex.”); Berl v. County of Westchester, 84 Civ. 8505, 1986 WL 746, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9,
1986) (“However, on the facts before me equal job opportunity must in some measure
give way to the right of privacy.” (emphasis added)).
286. See Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1372 n.21 (11th Cir. 1982) (“A
number of courts have recognized the possibility of avoiding a clash between privacy
and employment rights by use of selective job assignments.”); Smith, 678 F.2d at 55
(“The resulting conflict between these two interests has normally been resolved by at
tempting to accommodate both interests through adjustments in scheduling and job
responsibilities for the guards.”); Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1212 (2d Cir. 1980)
(“Resolution of such cases requires a careful inquiry as to whether the competing inter
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In Edwards v. Department of Corrections, an Alabama Federal
District Court analyzed the ability of the Department of Correc
tions (DOC) to compromise between privacy rights and employ
ment rights relating to the performance of, among other things,
cross-gender pat searches.287 The DOC denied Officer Edwards a
permanent position as shift commander at the Julia Tutwiler Prison
for Women, asserting that the position had a female gender-based
BFOQ despite the fact that Officer Edwards had temporarily held
the position at the Tutwiler prison twice before, for a total of eleven
months.288
The Department asserted that Edwards could not perform the
job because, while his principle duty would be to supervise other
corrections officers, he could be called upon to physically search
inmates.289 Edwards was able to provide evidence, however, that
he “rarely if ever had to search female inmates while serving as
acting shift commander.”290 Instead of searching inmates himself,
“he was able to summon a female officer to perform” the search.291
Because the Department failed to provide evidence “that the
nature of the prison’s operation preclude[d] rearranging job respon
sibilities in a way that would eliminate the clash between the pri
vacy interests of inmates and the employment opportunities of
ests can be satisfactorily accommodated before deciding whether one interest must be
vindicated to the detriment of the other.”); Forde v. Baird, 720 F. Supp. 2d 170, 179-80
(D. Conn. 2010).
287. Edwards v. Dep’t of Corr., 615 F. Supp. 804, 808 (M.D. Ala. 1985).
288. Id. at 808-09. Edwards had not been the only man to hold this position, a
prior male officer had acted as shift supervisor. Id. at 809.
289. Id. The Department also asserted that, even without the discriminatory pol
icy, Edwards would not have been chosen for promotion. Id. at 807. Had the Depart
ment been able to prove that was the case Edwards would not have been able to show
an adverse employment decision resulting from gender. Id. at 806.
The requirement that a discriminatory practice result in an adverse employment
decision seems minor, but has made a difference in several prison Title VII cases. See
Tharp v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 68 F.3d 223, 225 (8th Cir. 1995) (upholding a policy where
only female Residential Advisors are assigned to the women’s unit because it was a
“minimal restriction that did not deprive plaintiffs of employment opportunities or oth
erwise adversely affect their employment status” (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Tipler v. Douglas County, No. 8:04CV470, 2006 WL 1314328, at *13
(D. Neb. May 11, 2006) (upholding a gender-based shift change because while undesir
able and inconvenient for the plaintiff, it did “not constitute an adverse employment
action”).
290. Edwards, 615 F. Supp. at 809.
291. Id. The male officer who had previously held the position had not searched
inmates either. Id.
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officers as shift commanders,” they violated Title VII by refusing to
promote Edwards based on his gender.292
Similarly, in Gunther v. Iowa State Men’s Reformatory, a dis
trict court in Iowa held that a prison had to compromise job respon
sibilities to protect employment rights.293 Ms. Gunther applied for
a position as a Correction Officer Level II (COII), which she was
denied on the basis of gender.294 Iowa asserted that the COII posi
tion required contact with inmates, which was not feasible for a wo
man on a number of grounds, including inmate privacy rights.295
The court, rather than interpreting this as a conflict between
inmate privacy rights and employment rights, interpreted the issue
as a conflict between administrative convenience and employment
rights.296 It was within the power of the prison to adjust the COII
responsibilities for Ms. Gunther to include only those that would
not implicate other concerns, such as inmate privacy concerns.297
The government responded that to adjust assignments for women
COII positions “would be economically and administratively un
sound and unfair to male co-workers who perform the gamut of
COII duties.”298 The court held, however, that “[n]one of these
reasons, alone or aggregated, is grounds for denying women their
right not to be discriminated against in employment
opportunity.”299
292. Id. at 810.
293. Gunther v. Iowa State Men’s Reformatory, 462 F. Supp. 952, 958 (N.D. Iowa
1979).
294. Id. at 954.
295. Id. at 955. The prison stated “women in contact positions . . . would: (1)
violate prisoners’ privacy rights; (2) jeopardize prison security and rehabilitative pro
grams; (3) put the guards, both male and female, in increased danger; and (4) lead to
major disciplinary problems.” Id. The prison also asserted that “fashioning a rotation
to avoid placing them in dangerous areas or in areas where inmate privacy must be
maintained would be unfair to male officers and would create serious administrative
problems.” Id.
296. Id. at 957. In response to the government’s claim that its concern was for
inmate privacy rights, the court stated that “[p]rivacy is certainly to be respected but the
essence of the facility is not a function of having all personnel available to work in all
areas.” Id.
297. Id. “Any inconvenience in scheduling cannot outweigh plaintiff’s rights.”
Id. (emphasis added).
298. Id.
299. Id.
[I]f complaints of fellow workers were grounds for a [BFOQ], Title VII could
be gutted by the gripes of entrenched employees. Clearly job assignment ad
justments within the facility in the past have not undermined its essential goals
or functions. While there may be a valid reason to limit certain of the func
tions of female correction officers, there is no legal reason to cut them off
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There are several practical solutions that may be implemented,
short of a BFOQ, which protect both inmates’ rights to be free from
cross-gender pat searches and employment rights. While none of
these solutions is guaranteed to work in every institution, the avail
ability of several potential solutions demonstrates the feasibility im
plementing processes that protect both sets of rights. When
weighing the feasibility of any given solution, an administrator
should remember that administrative inconveniences do not excuse
the violation of either employment or inmate rights.300
1. Gender Specific Tasks301
The first solution is to make performance of a pat search a gen
der specific task. Rather than requiring all corrections staff in a
certain position to do pat searches, a prison may make the perform
ance of pat searches specific to the gender of the prisoner. Many
prisons, even those that currently allow cross-gender pat searches,
already use gender-specific tasks for performance of strip
searches.302 Under this solution, performance of pat searches is not
related to a specific job and thus should not be a bar to promo
tion.303 Therefore, a prison can ensure that neither men nor women
are discriminated against in job opportunities.
completely from COII classification and the opportunities that classification
offers.
Id. In regards to prison concerns relating to scheduling the court stated that
“[b]alancing the federal right not to be discriminated against in employment against the
administrative inconvenience of functional scheduling dictates institutional adjustments
which will not substantially affect the efficient operation of the facility or undermine its
essential functions. Administrative inconvenience cannot justify discrimination.” Id.
(emphasis added).
300. Id. at 957.
301. Cases that suggest the use of gender-specific tasks include Edwards v. Dep’t
of Corr., 615 F. Supp. 804, 809 (M.D. Ala. 1985) (striking BFOQ for shift commander
position because plaintiff could summon a female officer to perform pat searches);
Gunther, 462 F. Supp. at 957 (referencing the “substantial number of jobs within the
facility that can be performed by a qualified female COII”).
302. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM
STATEMENT NUMBER 5521.05, SEARCHES OF HOUSING UNITS, INMATES, AND INMATE
WORK AREAS § 552.11, at 3 (1997) (“Staff of the same sex as the inmate shall make the
search, except where circumstances are such that delay would mean the likely loss of
contraband.”); see Forde v. Baird, 720 F. Supp. 2d 170, 179 (D.Conn. 2010) (“[T]he fact
that [FCI Danbury] already prohibits routine visual searches by male staff suggests that
gender-based staff movements is eminently possible.”).
303. Warden Donna Zickefoose testified that any member of the staff at FCI
Danbury can perform a pat search. Transcript of Bench Trial Volume 2 at 171, Forde v.
Baird, 720 F. Supp. 2d 170 (D. Conn. 2010) (No. 3:03CV1424). While any staff member
can perform the search, they are most often done by corrections officers. Id.
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While easy to explain, this solution does impose potential ad
ministrative difficulties. At FCI Danbury, a federal female institu
tion, only one-third of corrections staff are women.304 As a result,
two-thirds of the staff would not be able to perform what is gener
ally recognized as an essential component of prison security.305
This hurdle is not, however, insurmountable. To the extent that
there are certain areas or times within a prison where pat searches
are more likely to occur,306 it is easy for prison administrators to
ensure that there is a woman stationed nearby to accommodate that
need. This solution would require female staff to perform more pat
searches than they currently do; the complaints of staff, however,
do not justify violation of constitutional rights.307
2. Gender Conscious Scheduling
A related solution involves gender-conscious scheduling.
Under this solution, the schedule would be modified to ensure that
a certain number of women (or men) were working within the
prison during each shift. The schedule would not assign specific po
sitions based on gender. Nor would the scheduling be based on
gender alone, so long as sufficient female (or male) staff were as
signed to each shift. For many BOP male institutions this should
not be a problem because 75% of the staff is the same gender as the
inmates.308
The potential does arise for an employee subject to genderconscious scheduling to bring a discrimination suit. In Tipler v.
Douglas County, an officer brought a claim based on being moved
to a less desirable shift as a result of her gender.309 The district
court in Nebraska dismissed her claim, holding that a change in
shift, while undesirable and inconvenient, did not constitute an “ad
verse employment action.”310 Without an adverse employment de
304. See infra Table 2.
305. See infra Table 2; Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1099 (8th Cir. 1990).
306. The District Court of Connecticut in Forde v. Baird noted that “like visual
searches, the vast majority of pat searches occur at predictable times and places,” thus
making it “especially puzzling” that FCI Danbury would assert that accommodating
Forde’s religious right to same-sex pat searches would implicate staffing issues. Forde,
720 F. Supp. 2d at 181.
307. Gunther v. Iowa State Men’s Reformatory, 462 F. Supp. 952, 957 (N.D. Iowa
1979).
308. See infra Table 4.
309. Tipler v. Douglas County, No. 8:04CV470, 2006 WL 1314328, at *1 (D. Neb.
May 11, 2006).
310. Id. at *13.

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE211.txt

612

unknown

Seq: 46

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

27-SEP-11

10:25

[Vol. 33:567

cision, there had been no violation of Title VII; her employment
rights had not been violated.311
Prison administrators can minimize the amount of gender-con
scious scheduling necessary by providing their staff with radios or
some other communication device.312 Then, if a female officer is
available anywhere on the compound she can be contacted quickly
to come and perform the pat search.313 This strategy should be fea
sible, given that there is no Federal prison where same-gender staff
constitutes less than 30% of the total staff.314
3. Same-Gender Rover Positions
Prison administrators may have a legitimate concern that call
ing for a same-gender officer for performance of a pat search may
weaken security. The officers called for would need to choose be
tween finding a replacement for their own post before attending to
the pat search and leaving the post unoccupied. While the officer
tries to find a replacement, someone would need to watch the in
mate selected for the pat search and would therefore also be unable
to continue performing his or her job responsibilities. “[T]he preci
sion operation of a prison facility does not allow for such on-the-fly
staffing adjustments.”315 To address this concern, the institutions
could hire one or two additional officers per shift whose job it is to
perform pat searches.
This solution has several potential problems. First, these posi
tions would need to be gender-based BFOQs to ensure that the of
ficers assigned would be able to perform same-sex pat searches. It
stands to reason, however, that one or two gender specific posts per
311. Id.; see also Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993) (“At trial,
the prison officials’ own witnesses testified that not a single bid had been refused, pro
motion denied, nor guard replaced as a result of the ban on routine cross-gender
clothed body searches.”); Forde, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 181 (“[G]ender-based assignment of
shifts, even where it prevents correctional officers from selecting preferred assignments,
is a ‘minimal restriction’ that can be tolerated.” (citations omitted)).
312. Edda Cantor, a correctional expert offered by the government in the Forde
v. Baird case, testified that she had observed that most of the staff at FCI Danbury
carried radios, and that, in fact, female staff could be summoned to perform strip
searches via radio. Transcript of Bench Trial Volume 2 at 76-77, Forde v. Baird, 720 F.
Supp. 2d 170 (D. Conn. 2010) (No. 3:03CV1424).
313. “Forde presented expert testimony that, in many circumstances, the sum
moning of a female correctional officer to conduct a pat search in a non-emergency
situation could involve nothing more than an immaterial minute or two delay.” Forde,
720 F. Supp. 2d at 174.
314. See infra Table 2.
315. Forde, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 174.
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shift are preferable to a blanket rule requiring all contact positions
to be same-gender. Furthermore, the feasibility of such assign
ments is apparent in that the Federal Bureau of Prisons already
does not allow cross-gender strip searches,316 searches which occur
in specific locations and thus require that the staff assigned to those
locations be same-gender.
Second, these additional positions may be expensive. The Mis
souri Department of Corrections estimated additional annual costs
of over $18.3 million to “provide three additional posts per institu
tion and supervision to provide on-call same gender pat search ca
pability.”317 To limit additional costs, institutions could make the
decision to have these additional officers only on during those pre
dictable times when pat searches are more likely to occur. Beyond
that, many facilities will already have rover positions, therefore the
institution would not need to hire new staff—rather it would merely
need to change a few existing positions to BFOQs.
4. Allow Inmates to Request Same-Gender Pat Searches318
The final solution, while not ideal, reflects both a concern for
the potentially significant adverse employment effects against wo
men working in male prisons, and the fact that most male inmates
do not object to cross-gender pat searches.319 Prison administrators
would provide each inmate the opportunity to request same-sex pat
searches; if an inmate requests a same-sex pat search, the prison
would accommodate that request, designating the inmate as subject
only to same-sex pat searches through application of a sticker to the
inmate’s ID.320
316. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, PRO
STATEMENT NUMBER 5521.05, SEARCHES OF HOUSING UNITS, INMATES, AND IN
MATE WORK AREAS § 552.11(b)(2), at 2-3 (1997) (requiring that staff of the same
gender perform a visual search; defined as a search of “all body surfaces and body
cavities”).
317. See BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, supra note 118, at 15.
318. A similar approach was suggested in Forde v. Zickefoose, 612 F. Supp. 2d
171, 183 (D. Conn. 2009). Ms. Forde had requested an individual exemption from
cross-gender pat searches in relation to her Muslim faith. Id. at 175-76. Another
inmate at FCI Danbury had already been given an individual exemption “with little or
no impact on employment.” Id. at 181.
319. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
320. New York marks identification cards with the letters “CGPFE” to indicate
when a female inmate has been given a cross-gender pat search (frisk) exemption.
STATE OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, DIRECTIVE NO.
4910, CONTROL OF & SEARCH FOR CONTRABAND, § III(B)(3)(b)(2), at 3 (2001). If an
inmate has an exemption, a male officer may not search her in non-emergency circum
stances. Id.
GRAM

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE211.txt

614

unknown

Seq: 48

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

27-SEP-11

10:25

[Vol. 33:567

Allowing an inmate to opt out of cross-gender pat searches
protects an inmate’s constitutional rights, regardless of whether
those rights originate from religion, privacy and dignity, or feelings
of re-victimization. Unfortunately, this solution provides only lim
ited protection for inmates who are, in the course of a pat search,
subjected to sexual assault. An inmate who alleged sexual assault
would be able to opt out of future cross-gender pat searches. This
solution is not ideal because, as recognized by PREA, there should
be a zero-tolerance policy towards sexual assault; the occurrence of
even one assault is too many.
Furthermore, the ability to opt out of cross-gender pat searches
places a certain amount of autonomy with the inmate, an autonomy
which would not be implicated by a policy either allowing or disal
lowing cross-gender pat searches for all inmates. An inmate would
be able to opt out of cross-gender pat searches where performance
of a cross-gender pat search would not violate any constitutional
right—in other words, he or she might abuse the process to exercise
control over his or her environment.321 If, however, the other op
tion would be to create a BFOQ and thereby discriminate in em
ployment based on gender, the risk of inmate autonomy on this one
issue does not seem as grave.
CONCLUSION
Pat searches are an essential component of prison security,
helping to control the flow of contraband within the prison.322
Cross-gender pat searches, however, expose inmates to the poten
tial violation of a number of constitutionally protected rights, in
cluding those under the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. Other rights may also be violated, including rights
found in the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act,
as well as rights guaranteed by individual state constitutions. Crossgender pat searches also expose inmates to heightened risk of sex
ual assault by corrections staff. Sexual assault, in turn, affects more
than just the prisoner; it can undermine prison security as a whole.
321. While not directly addressed in this Note, allowing inmate autonomy in de
termining whether or not to request a same-sex pat search may also be beneficial in
instances involving transgender inmates. See MURRAY D. SCHEEL & CLAIRE EUSTACE,
MODEL PROTOCALS ON THE TREATMENT OF TRANSGENDER PERSONS BY SAN FRAN
CISCO COUNTY JAIL I(c), at 4 (2002) (suggesting that “[a]ll searches of the transgender
inmate’s person will be done by two officers of the gender requested by the transgender
inmate”), available at www.transgenderlaw.org/resources/sfprisonguidelines.doc.
322. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
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Because of these problems, the use of non-emergency crossgender pat searches must be abolished. The Prison Rape Elimina
tion Act Commission and the American Bar Association have both
already reached this conclusion.323 That does not mean, however,
that employment rights should be disregarded. While opponents of
prohibiting cross-gender pat searches claim that the inevitable re
sult is a high cost in terms of women’s employment opportuni
ties,324 that is not in fact the case. There are a number of practical
solutions that may be implemented by prisons to protect employ
ment rights without performing cross-gender pat searches. Solu
tions include creation of gender-specific tasks, using genderconscious scheduling, or allowing inmates to opt out of cross-gender
pat searches, thus protecting their own constitutional rights. While
administratively inconvenient, these solutions must be pursued
prior to engaging in employment discrimination. By pursuing a
practical solution other than a BFOQ, both inmate and employ
ment rights can be protected.
Robyn Gallagher*

323. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
* J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2011; Senior Articles
Editor, Western New England Law Review, Volume 33. I am grateful to my colleagues
on the Western New England Law Review for their hard work during the editorial pro
cess. I am also grateful to Professor Giovanna Shay, Western New England University
School of Law, Professor Brett Dignam, Columbia Law School, and Attorney Deborah
LaBelle, Law Offices of Deborah LaBelle, for their experience, insight, and guidance.
Finally, a very large thank you to my husband, Sean; my parents Steve and Laura; and
my siblings Paula, Seanna, Chelsea, and Cassidy; each of whom listened to me discuss
the topics within my Note ad nauseum.
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TABLE 1
RESULTS OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL SURVEY ON CROSS
GENDER PAT SEARCHES ON FEMALE INMATES STATE PAT
DOWN PRACTICES
State

Allow Cross-Gender
Pat Searches

Comments

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Maine
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

limit occurrence
emergency only
emergency only
emergency only
generally allowed
emergency only***
generally allowed
emergency only
emergency only
limit occurrence
limit occurrence
emergency only***
emergency only
generally allowed
limit occurrence
generally allowed
emergency only
emergency only
emergency only
Prohibited!
emergency only
limit occurrence
emergency only
generally allowed
emergency only
emergency only
generally allowed
Prohibited!
limit occurrence
generally allowed
generally allowed
generally allowed
emergency only
emergency only***
generally allowed
emergency only
limit occurrence
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State

Allow Cross-Gender
Pat Searches

Comments

South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
Washington, DC
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Prohibited!
limit occurrence
emergency only
emergency only***
emergency only***
emergency only***
emergency only***
Prohibited!
emergency only
emergency only
generally allowed

*** These states were not included in the Amnesty International Article,
statistics were instead obtained from Sandra Norman-Eady & George
Coppolo, Cross-Gender Body Searches in Correctional Institutions (Mar.
12, 2001), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2001/rpt/2001-r-0321.htm.
Amnesty International, Abuse of Women in Custody: Sexual Misconduct
and Shackling of Pregnant Women, Policies, Procedures and Practices of
Guarding Women (2006), http://www.amnestyusa.org/violence-against
women/abuse-of-women-in-custody/key-findings-policies-procedures-and
practices-of-guarding-women/page.do?id=1108299 (last visited Jan. 23,
2011).

Female
Female
Female
Female (small male)
Female (small male)
Female
Female

Waseca FCI
Carswell FMC
Danbury FCI
Dublin FCI
Tallahassee FCI
Alderson FPC
Bryan FPC

Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Minimum
Minimum

Security
Level
146
190
166
144
183
69
60
958

7,718

Male
Staff

790
1,469
1,135
1,155
1,157
1,096
916

#
Inmates

56.39%

69.52%
46.80%
66.67%
58.06%
63.99%
41.32%
45.11%

%

741

64
216
83
104
103
98
73

Female
Staff

OF J ULY

43.61%

30.48%
53.20%
33.33%
41.94%
36.01%
58.68%
54.89%

%

2009)

1,699

210
406
249
248
286
167
133

Total
Staff

unknown

Federal Bureau of Prisons, Staff Demographic Characteristics — All Staff (2009) (on file with author); Federal Bureau of
Prisons, Federal Prison Facilities (2009), http://www.bop.gov/DataSource/execute/dsFacilityLoc. Reports for each institution
were provided by the Federal Bureau of Prisons to the author on September 18, 2009. The author compiled the tables based
on information from the reports and facility information found at the Bureau of Prisons website.

Inmate
Gender

OF M ALE

618

Facility

PERCENTAGE

TABLE 2
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- Female camp

- Female camp
- Female camp

- Female camp
- Female camp

Adm
Adm
Adm
Adm
Adm
Adm
Adm
Adm
Adm
Adm
Low
Low
Low
Low
Medium
Medium
Medium
High
High

Security
Level
352
148
207
144
154
172
176
228
176
169
188
176
203
317
132
243
208
389
248
4,030

23,689

Male
Staff

2,549
667
1,373
635
679
1,031
847
1,511
1,140
1,080
1,118
921
2,058
1,500
711
1,112
1,257
2,040
1,460

#
Inmates

1,497

143
57
44
52
68
73
70
53
84
50
76
66
88
164
55
90
68
108
88

Female
Staff

27.09%

28.89%
27.80%
17.53%
26.53%
30.63%
29.80%
28.46%
18.86%
32.31%
22.83%
28.79%
27.27%
30.24%
34.10%
29.41%
27.03%
24.64%
21.73%
26.19%

%

2009)

5,527

495
205
251
196
222
245
246
281
260
219
264
242
291
481
187
333
276
497
336

Total
Staff

Seq: 53

72.91%

71.11%
72.20%
82.47%
73.47%
69.37%
70.20%
71.54%
81.14%
67.69%
77.17%
71.21%
72.73%
69.76%
65.90%
70.59%
72.97%
75.36%
78.27%
73.81%

%

OF J ULY

unknown
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Federal Bureau of Prisons, Staff Demographic Characteristics — All Staff (2009) (on file with author); Federal Bureau of Prisons, Federal Prison Facilities (2009), http://
www.bop.gov/DataSource/execute/dsFacilityLoc; Federal Bureau of Prisons, Institutions Housing Female Offenders, http://www.bop.gov/locations/female_facilities.jsp
(last visited Mar. 11, 2011). Reports for each institution were provided by the Federal Bureau of Prisons to the author on September 18, 2009. The author compiled the
tables based on information from the reports and facility information found at the Bureau of Prisons website.

Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed

Inmate
Gender

OF M ALE

2011]

Brooklyn MDC
Chicago MCC
Guaynabo MDC
Honolulu FDC
Houston FDC
Los Angeles MDC
New York MCC
Oklahoma City FTC
Philadelphia FDC
San Diego MCC
Miami FCI
Seatac FDC
Coleman Low FCI
Lexington FMC
Tucson FCI
Marianna FCI
Pekin FCI
Hazelton USP
Victorville USP

Facility

PERCENTAGE

TABLE 3
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Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male

Inmate
Gender
Adm
Adm
Adm
Adm
Adm
Adm
Minimum
Minimum
Minimum
Minimum
Minimum
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low

Security
Level

OF M ALE

971
1,129
1,553
907
990
1,177
903
897
1,069
723
786
1,427
1,283
1,257
1,547
1,949
1,374
2,460
947
2,011
4,262
1,756
1,467
1,440
1,296
1,537
1,396
1,296
1,332
1,795

#
Inmates
266
326
189
5
223
380
61
72
112
58
69
165
235
185
192
150
213
268
240
195
463
190
247
137
186
252
333
201
135
217

Male
Staff
54.29%
72.44%
69.49%
100.00%
52.47%
62.19%
66.30%
63.72%
70.89%
62.37%
63.30%
77.10%
84.84%
75.20%
77.42%
68.18%
66.77%
77.91%
80.00%
67.24%
77.95%
69.34%
76.23%
73.26%
80.52%
82.89%
74.00%
72.30%
75.00%
74.57%

%
224
124
83
202
231
31
41
46
35
40
49
42
61
56
70
106
76
60
95
131
84
77
50
45
52
117
77
45
74

Female
Staff

OF J ULY

45.71%
27.56%
30.51%
0.00%
47.53%
37.81%
33.70%
36.28%
29.11%
37.63%
36.70%
22.90%
15.16%
24.80%
22.58%
31.82%
33.23%
22.09%
20.00%
32.76%
22.05%
30.66%
23.77%
26.74%
19.48%
17.11%
26.00%
27.70%
25.00%
25.43%

%

2009)

490
450
272
5
425
611
92
113
158
93
109
214
277
246
248
220
319
344
300
290
594
274
324
187
231
304
450
278
180
291

Total
Staff

620

Butner FMC
Devens FMC
Miami FDC
Oakdale FDC
Rochester FMC
Springfield USMCFP
Duluth FPC
Montgomery FPC
Morgantown FCI
Pensacola FPC
Yankton FPC
Allenwood Low FCI
Ashland FCI
Bastrop FCI
Big Spring FCI
Beaumont Low FCI
Butner Low FCI
Elkton FCI
Englewood FCI
Forrest City FCI
Fort Dix FCI
Fort Worth FCI
La Tuna FCI
Lompoc FCI
Loretto FCI
Milan FCI
Oakdale FCI
Petersburg FCI
Safford FCI
Seagoville FCI

Facility

PERCENTAGE

TABLE 4
VS. FEMALE S TAFF - MALE I NSTITUTIONS ( AS
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Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male

Inmate
Gender
Low
Low
Low
Low
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium

Security
Level
1,327
1,386
1,088
1,920
1,376
1,971
1,876
1,724
1,671
1,406
1,558
728
1,671
1,275
1,742
1,196
1,236
1,397
1,213
1,736
1,682
1,246
929
1,715
1,561
1,882
1,241
942
1,310
1,384
1,058
1,117
1,945
940

#
Inmates
188
200
204
106
235
387
265
208
157
199
134
225
155
223
232
274
187
239
207
179
233
197
213
268
255
313
232
250
236
214
225
238
173
227

Male
Staff
78.99%
75.19%
72.60%
57.30%
80.76%
81.30%
79.10%
67.31%
74.06%
77.73%
74.44%
71.66%
72.09%
79.36%
71.60%
83.79%
68.00%
77.35%
78.71%
66.30%
80.34%
70.36%
75.53%
78.36%
81.99%
85.75%
76.82%
82.51%
83.10%
70.63%
78.67%
83.80%
64.07%
76.69%

%
50
66
77
79
56
89
70
101
55
57
46
89
60
58
92
53
88
70
56
91
57
83
69
74
56
52
70
53
48
89
61
46
97
69

Female
Staff
21.01%
24.81%
27.40%
42.70%
19.24%
18.70%
20.90%
32.69%
25.94%
22.27%
25.56%
28.34%
27.91%
20.64%
28.40%
16.21%
32.00%
22.65%
21.29%
33.70%
19.66%
29.64%
24.47%
21.64%
18.01%
14.25%
23.18%
17.49%
16.90%
29.37%
21.33%
16.20%
35.93%
23.31%

%

238
266
281
185
291
476
335
309
212
256
180
314
215
281
324
327
275
309
263
270
290
280
282
342
311
365
302
303
284
303
286
284
270
296

Total
Staff

2011]

Sandstone FCI
Texarkana FCI
Terminal Island FCI
Yazoo City FCI
Allenwood Medium FCI
Atlanta USP
Beckley FCI
Bennettsville FCI
Beaumont Medium FCI
Beaumont USP
Butner Medium II FCI
Butner Medium I FCI
Coleman Medium FCI
Cumberland FCI
Edgefield FCI
El Reno FCI
Estill FCI
Fairton FCI
Florence FCI
Forrest City Medium FCI
Gilmer FCI
Greenville FCI
Herlong FCI
Jesup FCI
Lompoc USP
Leavenworth USP
Manchester FCI
Marion USP
McKean FCI
Memphis FCI
Otisville FCI
Oxford FCI
Petersburg Medium FCI
Phoenix FCI

Facility
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Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
High
High
High
High
High
High
High
High
High
High
High
High
High
High

Security
Level
108
184
235
271
217
489
215
241
157
198
235
286
284
293
304
201
215
279
285
292
425
285
333
236
67
19,778

122,469

Male
Staff

446
1,236
1,319
1,391
921
1,330
1,016
1,271
1,300
1,749
1,536
1,153
1,239
1,416
1,297
1,557
1,503
456
971
1,490
942
1,566
1,380
955
1,643

#
Inmates

24.40%

30.32%
22.69%
20.34%
15.31%
26.19%
18.64%
17.94%
28.70%
31.44%
32.88%
32.86%
15.63%
16.22%
17.70%
16.25%
21.79%
19.48%
19.36%
15.18%
19.34%
12.37%
19.03%
18.18%
19.73%
24.72%

%

26,163

155
238
295
320
294
601
262
338
229
295
350
339
339
356
363
257
267
346
336
362
485
352
407
294
89

Total
Staff

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

6,385

47
54
60
49
77
112
47
97
72
97
115
53
55
63
59
56
52
67
51
70
60
67
74
58
22

Female
Staff

Seq: 56

75.60%

69.68%
77.31%
79.66%
84.69%
73.81%
81.36%
82.06%
71.30%
68.56%
67.12%
67.14%
84.37%
83.78%
82.30%
83.75%
78.21%
80.52%
80.64%
84.82%
80.66%
87.63%
80.97%
81.82%
80.27%
75.28%

%

unknown

Federal Bureau of Prisons, Staff Demographic Characteristics – All Staff (2009) (on file with author); Federal Bureau of Prisons, Federal Prison Facilities (2009), http://
www.bop.gov/DataSource/execute/dsFacilityLoc. Reports for each institution were provided by the Federal Bureau of Prisons to the author on September 18, 2009. The author
compiled the tables based on information from the reports and facility information found at the Bureau of Prisons website.

Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male

Inmate
Gender

622

Pollock Medium FCI
Ray Brook FCI
Shuylkill FCI
Sheridan FCI
Talladega FCI
Terre Haute FCI
Three Rivers FCI
Victorville Medium I FCI
Victorville Medium II FCI
Williamsburg FCI
Yazoo City Medium FCI
Allenwood USP
Atwater USP
Big Sandy USP
Canaan USP
Coleman II USP
Coleman I USP
Florence Admax USP
Florence High USP
Lee USP
Lewisburg USP
McCreary USP
Pollock USP
Tucson USP
Terre Haute USP

Facility
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